Belly-Buster
February 27, 2006 at 1:32 pm | In Bet Patterns | Leave a Comment
First published in Poker Player Newspaper
LindaMae swung past me muttering, “I don’t know how he does it because my daddy told me never draw to an inside Straight, but George did it and won a big pot on the River, having raised before the Flop with a three-gap, suited connector and acted like he played the hand correctly, smiling as he stacked a big pot at that $2-4 Hold’Em table I just left because I couldn’t stand it any longer.” “Stop,” I said, patting a chair, “park your caboose on this siding here, and let off steam by telling me what happened.”
On the button in a ten-handed game, George raised pre-Flop with [7d]-[3d]. The Small Blind called. In the big blind with [Ah]-[Td], LindaMae called. Five limpers called. Eight-handed they saw the dealer flop [6s]-[5c]-[Th].
Holding Top Pair, Top Kicker, LindaMae led with $2 after the Small Blind checked. Five called. The dealer turned the [Ac], making the top Two Pairs for LindaMae. She led with $4. Four called. The dealer put the [4s] on the table. LindaMae saw the possible Straight, deemed it unlikely, and led with a $4 bet. Everyone folded except George, who raised. She called; George showed down his 2nd-nut Straight and stacked a $75 pot after the toke, house rake, and bad-beat drop. “How could he play that hand so badly?” she asked.
Your daddy’s advice is correct for Draw, I told her. But for Hold’Em, with its three rounds of betting before the River and typically many limpers at its lower limits, the pot odds can make drawing to an inside Straight profitable.
George is a rational player, I told her. He had a 15% chance for a good Flop (3.3% for Two Pairs or Trips, 11% for two diamonds, plus a small chance for a Straight or better). When five players limped, George counted on them to call another bet, and gambled that you and/or the Small Blind would also call. Post-Flop, George had 4 outs: any Four out of the 47 unknown cards would make a Straight. At his turn to act, his pot odds were $39 for $2, an easy call. Post-Turn, George had three clean outs, (the 4f would have put three trumps on the tableau). His cards odds were about 1 in 15 (3/46). His pot odds were about 16 for 1 ($67 for $4) because he was sure you would call his bet if he hit the Straight. His expectation was positive, and even if the 4f did appear, someone’s having a Flush wasn’t certain. “Why didn’t he fear that someone held the nut Straight?” she asked. George knew that his 2ndnut Straight would win 82% of the time, I told her. (“Straight Skinny,” Poker Player, March 7, 2005, p. 18.) When you led the betting when the dealer turned the Ace, he put you on Two Pairs. Then when everyone else folded to your River bet, he knew that he had the better hand.
George knows that bigger pots pre-Flop always give him better pot odds on the Turn and River. He knows also that when holding gapped connectors, inside Straight draws are more likely than openended draws. Knowing George, I asked her, don’t you think that he raised pre-Flop in part because he suspected he might need big pot odds on the later streets. LindaMae didn’t answer, which I took to mean,”Yes, he made a great play raising with those rags.”
‘High’ Stakes Poker
February 27, 2006 at 12:53 pm | In Uncategorized | Leave a Comment
High-altitude poker among four superstars
by Phil Hellmuth
First published in Card Player
As I prepared to return home from Monte Carlo, I decided to give up my airline ticket and pay for a one-way seat on Larry Flynt’s private jet. With one quick stop scheduled in Bangor, Maine, for fuel and pizza (they deliver it right to the plane), it was to be pretty much a 12-hour straight shot to Vegas. More importantly, Phil Ivey, Gus Hansen, Mike “The Mouth” Matusow, and I were scheduled to play $400-$800 limit poker all the way home! So, what was there not to like? We were flying high in Larry’s Gulfstream IV and playing high-stakes poker (so that the time would pass more quickly), and perhaps I could win 50 thousand by the time we got home.
We hired a dealer to deal to us all the way home, and even before we were off the ground, the cards were in the air. Because Ivey had won both tournaments in Monte Carlo the previous two nights (for $1.6 million), and because he wasn’t used to playing poker for such modest stakes (he’s used to limits of at least $2,000-$4,000), I thought he might be off his game a bit. He wasn’t. Gus wasn’t used to playing this limit, either, so he figured to be playing way too loose, which he did, but he barbecued Matusow and me anyway.
In fact, Gus made the game much bigger than $400-$800 with his superloose and superaggressive style, and after seven hours, Mike and I had lost more than $75,000 each. Having two players lose more than $75,000 apiece at any point during a $400-$800 game normally would be unthinkable. But then you have to factor in the “Gus effect.” When I became roughly an $80,000 loser, my original first-class ticket home was looking pretty attractive.
By the way, Matusow was playing tough poker almost the entire way home; he had only a couple of five-minute lapses. I felt I was playing well, also, but you’ll have to ask Ivey and Hansen. Matusow would tell you I played badly (he always says people played poorly in retrospect). Nonetheless, Mike wound up losing $96,000, and I was lucky enough to cut my own loss to $18,000 or so.
We were playing a mixed-game rotation, including Omaha eight-or-better, hold’em, deuce-to-seven triple draw, and Chinese poker. During the course of play, Ivey played one hold’em hand particularly well. He raised with A-10, and I called from the big blind with K-10. The flop was 10-6-5, and I bet out $400. Ivey raised to $800, I reraised to $1,200, and Ivey called. I then bet $800 “in the dark” (before seeing what the next card was). When a 7 hit on fourth street, Ivey called me. Then, I waited to see the last card; I didn’t want to bet in the dark into a potential four-card straight board like 10-6-5-7-8. But, it was a jack. I bet $800, and Ivey raised to $1,600. I called, and Ivey took down a nice pot.
The hand was played about the way it should have been. I was unlucky to have the K-10 side of the hand, of course, but Ivey’s raise on the end was a superstar play, especially if he was willing to fold his hand for a reraise from me. In fact, the jack on the end would have prevented me from reraising if I had happened to have a different two pair than J-10, since it would have been easy for me to put him on J-10. So, he couldn’t get reraised unless I was extremely powerful, in which case he presumably would have folded his hand. And he would get called by me if I had a 10 with any kicker, which was likely in a fourhanded game, especially with me being in the big blind.
Congrats to Phil Ivey for winning two out of two tournaments in Monte Carlo; I’m impressed. Next time I will ride in the jet the entire trip, but I won’t underestimate Mr. Ivey! Have I ever?
Poker – Bluffing
February 27, 2006 at 12:39 pm | In Bet Patterns | Leave a Comment
by Steve Rosenbloom
First published in Norwalk Advocate
Chris “Jesus” Ferguson put on that kind of clinic in a hand against Phil Hellmuth in the finals of last year’s National Heads-Up Poker Championship.
Dealt J-10 offsuit, Ferguson raised on the button.
Holding J-J, Hellmuth called.
The flop came A-8-7, two spades. Hellmuth checked. Ferguson had a gutshot straight draw, but he’s dead to an ace, king, queen, 8 or 7.
“But it’s kind of worth a bluff here because I have a chance to hit a really good hand,” Ferguson said. “If a 9 comes at any point in the hand, I could win a monster pot, even though it’s a long shot.”
Ferguson bet $30,000. Hellmuth check-raised another $60,000.
“This is where I could fold this hand,” Ferguson said. “If I was out of position, I’d fold. He doesn’t necessarily have an ace. He’s probably more likely to have an 8 or 7 than an ace. If he has an ace, he can slow-play the hand because he might not think I could catch up. He can let me try to bluff my chips off to him. If he has an 8 or 7 and thinks he’s ahead, he might want to take the pot right there.
“I decide to call. I can still hit that 9, and a 10 or a jack might be good. And I plan on stealing the pot because I have position.”
The turn came a 6. Hellmuth checked again.
“It’s a little bit scary to Phil because it makes a straight,” Ferguson said. “At this point, I decide to bet again, $90,000, about half the size of the pot. I’m a little bit surprised Phil called here. Now I’m thinking he might have that ace.
“I’m done with the hand at this point. It’s not my intention to bluff on the river, but I decide if a spade comes, I’ll bluff on the river. Or maybe if a 5 comes. It has to be a scary card. If a 9 comes, obviously I’m going to bet for value because I have the nuts. But even if a jack or 10 came, I wouldn’t bet because I don’t think it’s good.”
The river came a king of spades.
“A very good card,” Ferguson said. “It puts the spades out there, it puts the king out there. I could have A-K at this point. If he has a weak ace, he has to be pretty worried. So I bet the $180,000. It’s a complete bluff with a jack high.”
Ferguson was bluffing with a straight draw, but the flush draw got there. Either way, he knew his betting pattern looked like someone on a draw, and he had the heart to carry off the move with one more big bet that forced Hellmuth to fold.
Table talk
On the button: The last player to act; noted by a hockey puck-shaped disk that says “Dealer.”
Steve Rosenbloom is a sports columnist for the Chicago Tribune and the author of the new book “The Best Hand I Ever Played,” now available in bookstores. He can be reached at srosenbloom@tribune.com.
Straight Draws in Omaha H/L Part 3
February 25, 2006 at 4:45 pm | In Omaha H/L | Leave a Comment
by Sam Mudaro
First published in Poker Player
Today we will end our discussion of straight draws by looking at hands containing double connectors with no gaps, one gap and two gaps. We will look at all combinations of how the hand may be suited and include the non-suited variety.
Each of these simulations was run a minimum of 100,000 times with many run a million or more. As usual they were run at a full tight table with the same tight players playing each hand from all positions.
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By examining the charts below it is apparent that the best hands, those producing the highest net return or lowest loss, are those of the double suited variety. On the other hand it should come as no surprise that the non-suited variety offer the poorest net return. This observation serves as additional reinforcement that a suited hand is always preferable to a non-suited hand
Another fact easily discernable from the three charts is that as in all other forms of poker, the greater the gap the less likely it is to complete the straight. The no gap straight draws are approximately twice as profitable as the single gap straight draws. The two gapers overall produce a negative return. When you reach the two-gap level or higher you should only concentrate on those hands containing the A-2.
All the hands containing an A-2 are profitable regardless of how they are suited and even if they are not suited. Again, what makes these hands profitable is their excellent low potential even when they miss the straight. Of course when they are double suited with the Ace in particular you have a powerful hand capable of sweeping the entire pot. You will usually win a larger pot and make out like a bandit even if you get quartered on the low when you hit that flush. When you do get lucky and flop the nut flush you should always raise or re-raise. You may still get plenty of action from the other lows and any king or queen high flushes who may unknowingly put you on nothing more than a low.
The 2-3-4-5 and 2-3-5-6 are mostly profitable in the no gap and one gap variety but again this has more to do with their low potential. Although not shown one should avoid playing any three gap straight drawing unless they contains an A-2. This concludes my series of articles on straight draws. Next time I will begin a series of what kind of hands win and how table personality affects the outcome as well as that of the individual player. Each of those simulations will be run 10,000,000 times to insure randomness.
So what have we learned? Having two connectors does not improve our straight draw chances unless it is combined with a flush draw and also contains a nut low or possibly nut low draw. One should not look at a straight draw as a reason to play a hand. It should be viewed as an additional benefit to a hand that would otherwise be playable.
Player’s Blocks
February 25, 2006 at 4:09 pm | In Psychology | Leave a Comment
by Jim McKenna
First published in Poker Player
At a recent book signing, a young woman came up to me and asked what she could do about her being stuck as a writer. She is a nurse and was writing about some of her experiences with various medical procedures. She was writing a book about the psychological conflicts and aftermath of abortions. I told her that such a book would appeal to both pro-life and pro-choice readers. About the writer’s block problem, I encouraged her to keep writing. I told her to sit down and start writing even if she didn’t have a thought to write about. I encouraged her to go full-speed ahead and before she knew it, her block would disappear. I knew where that answer had come from. I was also going full speed ahead in answering a difficult question. This method works for me and I seldom let writer’s block have the final say.
It occurred to me that poker players have what could be referred to as “player’s blocks.” There are many times when, regardless of how good a player you are, the cards and your luck seem to have vanished. The question is, “What do you do to overcome such player’s blocks?” I wondered, “Would the same advice that I gave about writer’s block be sage here?” So, when my luck and good cards took a holiday, I would put my head down, took my own advice, and played any two hole cards in Texas Hold ‘em. I’d do this at least until the flop. It was like just sitting down and writing with no ideas whatsoever. Playing any two cards seemed foolish and instead of breaking the player’s block, it could have meant going deeper into bad play and bad luck. Well, it didn’t happen like that. It worked best when there was a loose table and no one was raising before the flop. But, the fact that it worked at all was my biggest surprise.
What I discovered was that when I was getting bad cards and having bad luck, I was waiting for good cards and taking little or no risks. Other players were cashing in on my tight play. When I played any two cards it forced me to start playing again. For, in reality, when I was playing too tight I really was seldom in the game. At least when I played garbage hole cards, I could hope for a garbage flop. After all, they came frequently when I’d only play good hole cards.
Now it may sound like I am promoting “No Fold ‘em Hold ‘em.” I’m not. No more than I would have encourage that young nurse to publish the dribble that might come out when she’d just sit down and start writing with no thoughts to write. It was a way to break the pattern and to get into writing again. Eventually, the good thoughts would come back and the block would be broken. The same proved true with breaking a poker player’s blocks. Once the pattern was broken and I was in the game again, I could lay down the impossible odds and risk some adventurous hands. It was a way to mix up my play. It was also a way to confuse my opponents who knew how to anticipate my usual moves. It was poker and produced some amazing results. As a writer, I am amazed with the material that’s waiting to be discovered before the block. The same is true when handling player’s blocks. There are hands that I played that I only would have played in tournament play when the blinds justified looser play.
It’s good to break through your blocks whether at the computer or at the poker tables. I never have experienced breaking such blocks by procrastinating and waiting for them to go away. Player’s blocks happen to both proponents of tight and loose poker. So, go figure!
$500,000 Tournament Winner Disqualified
February 24, 2006 at 8:48 pm | In Uncategorized | Leave a Comment
by Earl Burton
First published in Poker News
As my colleague and friend John Caldwell reported recently, the world of online poker tournaments are getting to the level where they are challenging some of the brick and mortar casino events around today with the size of their prize pools. One of the bigger events is at PartyPoker, who ran their $500K Guaranteed Tournament Sunday (February 12th). The $200 buy in event, supplemented by a wealth of satellite players from the site, usually draws well over 2,500 runners for the tournament and ensures that the prize pool for the tournament will well exceed the guarantee. In the end, an unknown player by the name of “ABlackCar” ended up taking the first place prize worth over $140,000.
That’s what we thought until last week, however.
In a difficult, but necessary decision, the first place prize was stripped from the event winner and everyone moved up one slot on the money list. The reasons for this should serve as a warning to anyone else who attempts the act and has to be applauded by the online poker community for the actions taken to protect the integrity of the game.
After being stripped of the first place bounty, it was revealed on many of the online forums that “ABlackCar” was actually being financed by a player by the name of ‘JJProdigy’, who is viewed by many as one of the top ten players on the Internet and also played in the $500K event. In a posting at one of these forums after “ABlackCar” was stripped of the win, ‘JJProdigy’ defended himself, stating that the second account was for his grandmother to play on. When she worked her way deep into the tournament, ‘JJProdigy’ stated that he took over for her and let people know at the tables that he was playing the account.
After a few days, however, the true story of the event worked its way into the light. ‘JJProdigy’ eventually confessed to the deception that he had been running. In a second posting, ‘JJProdigy’ admitted to knowingly setting up the second account at the end of 2005 and, in fact, was playing both accounts throughout the tournament. It seems that he had heard of other players doing it and figured that he shouldn’t be left out of the potential windfall (he explained it as “positive EV”). He also goes on to allege that many players he knows do the same thing and that many online sites have no idea that it is happening.
First off, one must credit PartyPoker and the policing of their games. They could have just gone on about their business and let ‘JJProdigy’ continue doing what he was doing. After all, they were making their money and it wasn’t their concern to correct this issue or make it right for the rest of the players in the event. As with most (if not all) of the online poker rooms, PartyPoker spells out very distinctly the penalties for inappropriate actions such as ‘JJProdigy’s’ ruse, and the penalty isn’t a light one; revocation of any monies won and the immediate cancellation of all accounts involved. This was the action that ‘JJProdigy’ found himself hit with and justifiably so. Within a couple days of this story breaking, PokerStars started its own internal investigation, found impropriety, and also closed the JJProdigy account on their platform.
Now onto ‘JJProdigy’ himself. Why he felt the need to attempt such a scheme is a great first question. As stated before, he has been able to make a significant impact in the online poker rooms through some excellent play. It is obvious that he has some talent, otherwise he wouldn’t have reached that rarefied air of being one of the Top Ten in the Internet community. Was it getting more difficult for him to “make it” in the Internet poker world because of this notoriety? Were people taking more shots at him, trying to take down one of the Top Guns of online poker and he was losing? Or was it a case of a young man who was simply trying to shoot an angle and got caught? These are a few questions that immediately pop to mind and, if given some time, I’m sure I could work up many more!
While PartyPoker and PokerStars have dealt with ‘JJProdigy’ (and appropriately, I must add), I think the action should be taken one step further. It is known that the online poker rooms share quite a bit of information to combat dishonest activities. I would suggest that ‘JJProdigy’s’ actions should result in a ban across the board and be implemented for every room on the Internet. When a person is found cheating in one of the physical casinos in Las Vegas, Atlantic City or elsewhere, there is normally an immediate ban on the person that follows them to other gaming locations like literary character Hester Prynne’s scarlet “A” emblazoned on her bosom. Many a card counter in blackjack has found themselves in this situation and banishment from the casinos of a particular locale is on the light end of the punishment scale. As such, the only logical course of action to take is the banishment of ‘JJProdigy’ from the online poker world.
While it might be a harsh punishment, it is the only way to ensure that online poker can continue to be viewed as a viable entity in Internet gaming. There are already the “Chicken Littles” of the message boards that rant about the possibilities of RNG rigging, collusion and other potential cheating maneuvers being plied by those that play on the Internet tables. Does this occur elsewhere? Of course. Is this widely rampant? Probably not.
Additionally, the chances of actual collusion in a poker tournament with 300 or 400 (or more) tables in play is still microscopic. Make no mistake, PartyPoker, and PokerStars took correct action here, and this young man was just the first one caught in a public manner. Discouraging players in this severe manner is the exact way to deal with situations like this. An example must be set, and ‘JJProdigy’ will be that example.
Now if you are worried about this being something that might happen to you, you shouldn’t be. The best course of action to take if you have several players that have accounts through your computer system is to not be playing in the same events or at the same cash tables. If you qualify or buy into a tournament, ensure that the second computer in your house that your significant other is playing on isn’t in the same game. This way, there isn’t that potential for indiscretion to come up. While it may be exciting for the potential of both (or however many) of you to make the final table, it is best to avoid the potential of ending up in the same mess ‘JJProdigy’ finds himself in today.
Two Key Ways We Learn to Play Poker
February 23, 2006 at 5:26 pm | In Psychology | 30 Comments
by Thomas Keller
Two primary ways in which we learn how to play poker, just as how we learn to do many other things in life, were coined by the famous psychologist B.F. Skinner, and they are positive reinforcement and negative reinforcement. Before I go any further, you might be wondering why these concepts matter to you as a poker player. Let me assure you that they matter a great deal, as these concepts influence your play on many levels, in both potentially good and bad ways, whether you realize it or not.
Positive reinforcement is fairly easy to explain; it involves being rewarded as a result of your behavior. An example of this would be overplaying a small pocket pair in limit hold’em, calling many bets and raises and catching one of your two outs on the river (assuming that you had outs), and winning a gigantic pot that you had no business winning. This example reinforces bad play (overplaying small pairs), and often affects not only the player who won, but other novice players at the table. A novice player who watches this unfold a few times may start to get the idea that this is the proper way to play such holdings, and may start playing much worse as a result. What that player is not seeing, of course, is all the times that these chasers go to the end and come up short. Another example of this is one of which I am guilty. I have an extreme fondness for playing pocket tens as a result of winning my first World Series of Poker bracelet with them. I have noticed that I tend to play them as a stronger hand than they really are, and I need to be very careful not to let the positive reinforcement of winning a bracelet with them delude my thinking when I am dealt them.
Negative reinforcement is a much more confusing concept, and one that people often mistake for punishment. Negative reinforcement is really quite similar to positive reinforcement, except that negative reinforcement encourages a specific behavior by ceasing or avoiding a negative condition. A lot of people confuse negative reinforcement with punishment, when they are in fact very different, as punishment is a way of discouraging a behavior by applying negative consequences to that behavior. Both positive reinforcement and negative reinforcement encourage specific types of behavior, but in different ways. Here is an excellent example of negative reinforcement, which I experience at some point in most sessions that I play.
I will put this as bluntly as possible: I hate to be stuck during a session, even if it’s just a relatively small amount. Not surprisingly, if you were to look at my win-loss records, you would see mostly wins with some big losses and virtually no small losses. This is negative reinforcement at work; being stuck is a negative condition that I will do most anything to rectify. This is not just a bad mentality for a professional poker player to have, but an awful one.
This mentality has cost me thousands of dollars in silly, negative expectation sports bets and pit gambling, in attempts to quickly make back what I had just lost playing poker. Furthermore, this mentality can lead to an increased chance of going on tilt, poor game selection, and playing longer sessions than one should. If I could simply play in games that I thought were good until I felt tired, felt like I was not playing well, or felt they were no longer worth playing, I’m very confident that my overall records would be better than they are now. Unfortunately, even to this day, I cannot quit playing when stuck, at least not without putting up a good fight. This learned behavior ravaged me early in my career, as I played much longer than my stamina would allow me to play properly, just to try to get even. And I often played in a very aggressive way to increase my fluctuations, hoping to get even faster, even though I knew I was making bad-expectation plays. I often made awful game-selection choices, playing in games with the highest variance rather than in smaller, easier games with better expectation.
Fortunately, these days I rarely go on tilt like I used to, and I have greatly built up my poker stamina to the point where I can play well over 20 hours at times and still feel like I am playing a decent game. However, even until very recently, this learned behavior continued to be a big problem for me, as I tortured myself by making huge sports bets to cover losing sessions. I vowed to quit sports betting and have kept that promise for many months now, so hopefully that aspect of this learned behavior will no longer be a problem.
As you can likely see by now, I could come up with countless examples of how positive and negative reinforcement affect how we play, but I don’t think that would be extremely helpful. Instead, I would like to strongly encourage you to realistically examine your own play. If you find that you are making some plays for illogical reasons — because of positive reinforcement, negative reinforcement, or something else entirely — do your best to correct the problem. You will likely struggle with some of these problems your entire poker career, as I fear I will with quitting when stuck. Just do your best to try, and at least be aware of your problems so that you can focus on doing things to make them less harmful to your bankroll. 
Thomas “Thunder” Keller is a 25-year-old professional poker player and one of poker’s young and rising stars. He can often be found playing at UltimateBet.com under the name thunderkeller. To learn more about him and to enlist in his new squadron, go to his website at http://www.thunderkeller.com/. Also, feel free to contact him at thunderkeller@yahoo.com.
Andy Beal Versus the Corporation – Big Bet Poker in the New World
February 20, 2006 at 5:42 pm | In Uncategorized | 3 Comments
by John Caldwell
First published in Poker News
Poker was on people’s minds at the Main Event of the LA Poker Classic, but one topic was on everyone’s lips – Andy Beal versus ‘the Corporation.’
A week of wild speculation, false retirements, and BIG bets concluded at Wynn Las Vegas this past weekend, with Andy Beal reportedly taking the Corporation down in their second heads up match in as many weeks.
Players in the Commerce Casino ballroom were talking about how Beal, who reportedly left the first match down about three million dollars, came back to win the Corporations stake of $10 million dollars.
The Corporation, according to our sources, is an ever-evolving collection of about 15 people who pooled their money, and put the pros into the heads up match with Beal, the famed Texas banker. The three players who did most of the playing
against Beal were Jennifer Harman, Ted Forrest, and Todd Brunson.
Beal is a fascinating tale. His life story evokes visions of a modern day Howard Hughes – with the notable exception that Beal is self-made. Beal has owned a company that designed rocket boosters, and built a billion dollar banking empire by buying loans no one else would touch in the S&L crisis of the late 1980’s. In addition, Beal is a very sophisticated mathematician who has published ‘The Beal Conjecture’, a revision of Fermat’s Last Theorem, a mathematical theory whose conclusion was apparently largely accepted for about 350 years….until Beal published his work in 1993.
Beal reportedly set most of the conditions for these matches, and apparently his selectivity paid off.
The second match capped about ten days of frenzied chatter, where the poker world was fascinated with the mystery, and intrigue of these people playing for some of the highest stakes ever recorded. Much of the information released by media outlets was gathered second hand, by talking to people involved in the game on breaks in hallways. After being fairly free with information for the first day or so of the first “session”, the people involved in the game made a concerted effort to tighten up the flow of information about what was actually happening at the table. Information became unreliable, and for a time there were rumors of the people near those involved in the game purposefully circulating misinformation about what was happening at table two of the Wynn card room. After all, this was a private game.
There is no question that this match fascinated the poker world. Equally, there is no question that it was a private game. To be fair, if the people involved truly wanted this to be a private game, they could have played in a private home, or hotel suite. But, the decision was made to play this in a card room, albeit in the private section of the card room.
At the end of the day, the vast majority of speculation suggests the following. Beal did win the Corporation’s stake of $10 million from them this past weekend in Las Vegas. Those numbers do not take into account the first set of matches, which reportedly ended with the Corp up about $3 to $3.5 million. The point is, that the only people who know the exact numbers are the ones involved in the match.
Things like this Beal/Corporation match are good for poker, and while the people involved in this match certainly have a right to hold a private game, poker is a very public affair these days. Anyone attempting something that holds this much appeal should be prepared for the accompanying interest of the poker world.
NOTE – Linda Geenan, who has her blog ‘Table Tango’ on our sister site, Poker Works has some interesting thoughts on Beal, given her history with him, and her being one of the more accomplished dealers in Vegas. We recommend you check it out. The picture attached to this story is Linda, Andy Beal, and Andy’s friend, and employee Craig Singer.
Playing the Blinds in Limit Hold’em Part IV — After a Nonsteal Raise
February 20, 2006 at 2:29 pm | In Holdem Limit | Leave a Commentby Barry Tanenbaum
pokerbear@cox.net
First published in Card Player
Analysis of a variety of situations in which the blinds face a preflop raise
Thus far, this series has discussed how to play the blinds if a late-position player raised with no one else in. Because this frequently can be a steal-raise, you can play quite a few hands. You can find those discussions, with the recommended hand-selection criteria and key thoughts, at http://www.cardplayer.com/.
In this column, we will look at a few scenarios in which the blinds are facing a raise from a different position or with more players in the hand. Specifically, we will examine the following situations:
• An early-position player raises, and everyone folds.
• An early-position player raises, and one person calls.
• An early-position player raises, and several players call.
• A middle-position player raises, and no one calls.
• A middle-position player raises after a player has called.
• A middle-position player raises, and several players call.
• A late-position player raises after one player has called.
• A late-position player raises after several players have called.
• The button raises after the cutoff calls.
Clearly, we cannot be comprehensive and cover every possibility, but this sampling should offer a good guideline of how to play the blinds when facing a nonsteal raise.
An early-position player raises, and everyone folds: If you were ever going to play tightly in the blinds, this is the moment. You are out of position against a player who has announced that he has a premium hand. If you are new to the game, you might think, “I don’t know this guy, and maybe he raises more often than he should.” If that were the case, someone else probably would have called or three-bet. The fact that everyone else folded should tell you that this is not the time to venture forth with a mediocre or poor holding. This is especially true if you hold an ace. In this situation, I would fold A-J automatically, and frequently would fold A-Q, as well. Small pocket pairs might be playable if you know the player is predictable (he will bet the flop and check the turn with a big ace, and bet with a big pair). If you are going to play a small pair from the small blind, though, you need to reraise to protect your pair from overcards held by the big blind, who will be tempted to call because you just made the pot bigger.
An early-position player raises, and one person calls: Even though you are now out of position to two players, you can play a few more hands here. Not only is the pot bigger, but the early-position raiser will play more honestly because of the additional player. Thus, it will be easier to tell where you are. However, bad aces play especially poorly here, even when suited, because if the raiser does not have a good ace, the caller might. Never play a bad ace. There is less reason to reraise from the small blind with a small to medium pair, as the extra player already has created too many overcards, and you primarily will be fishing for a set. Big cards are dangerous to play, but suited connectors can be played if you know how to fold them when you flop only a pair.
An early-position player raises, and several players call: You can call with a number of hands, but continue to avoid big-little combinations (for example, K-6 and A-4). Suited cards now have value, and you can play them, including suited aces (but beware of playing the hand if you flop a pair; you are looking for a flush draw or a miracle flop). One of the reasons you can play more hands is that most of the time the preflop raiser will bet. Since he is on your left, you will have excellent relative position for the first and maybe more rounds of betting. Thus, you can see what the others will do before committing yourself.
A middle-position player raises, and no one calls: Compared to the early-position raiser case, a middle-position raiser will have a greater variety of hands. As a result, the blinds will be able to play more hands. Actually, I recommend that the small blind still fold all but premium hands here, as he is still in a raise-or-fold situation, and is facing a real hand. The big blind can add back those suited aces, as well as K-Q and K-J, as they are less likely to be dominated here.
A middle-position player raises after a player has called: I have included this case because this raise has some interesting characteristics. It can’t be a steal-raise, as there is no hope of winning the blinds without a contest (the limper will call). But it could be an isolation raise made with mediocre values if the caller is a weak player and the raiser is aware of that and is capable of capitalizing on it. If this is the case, either blind can make a play with a decent hand by reraising. This may get the limper (and the big blind, if the small blind reraises) to fold, creating dead money and taking the initative away from a player who was just making a play. Note that this is a dangerous play, as the raiser may not have been thinking along the lines of an isolation raise and simply may have a premium hand. You really need to know your opponents to try this. If not, simply play as if the middle-position player had open-raised.
A middle-position player raises, and several players call: You can treat this case much the same as if the raise came from early position. Your relative position will be good after the flop, and the raiser should play honestly because of the callers behind him.
A late-position player raises after one player has called: All of the comments about isolation plays hold true here, and perhaps even more so. Late-position raisers take all sorts of liberties with raises, especially if they do not respect the single caller. Again, you can play lots of hands here, but give serious thought to reraising if you are going to play, occasionally with some of your weaker playable holdings. You still can show a long-term profit if you are a good player by creating dead money and gaining the initiative if everyone misses the flop. Again, you will be playing from out of position and, especially if the caller does not fold to your three-bet, will have to proceed cautiously.
A late-position player raises after several players have called: Surprisingly, this is not as good a situation for you as the one in which an early-position player raised and there were several callers. First, you will not be last to act, and there may well be more raising. Second, if form holds, everyone will check to the raiser on the flop, and he will bet. That will put you in the terrible position of having to act before the entire field. Thus, you should play only very good hands, and I do not recommend small cards even if they are connected. You can play suited connectors down to 6-5 suited, but you will need to hit the flop quite solidly to continue. All pocket pairs are playable.
The button raises after the cutoff calls: This is an extreme case of likely isolation. You should reraise with any hand you are going to play from either blind. The cutoff clearly has a mediocre hand and is likely a weak player, as he did not open-raise from late position. The button has no fear of someone waking up with a hand behind him, and his raise simply could be a combination isolation/steal. Still fold mediocre hands, but three-bet any hand with good high-card strength.
Conclusion: You need to be selective in playing the blinds against a raise no matter where it comes from. But you need to think about the likely strength of the raiser’s hand and your relative position after the flop to determine your playing criteria.
In the next issue, I will continue this series with some specific raising and reraising opportunities from the blinds.
More on No Limit Texas Hold’em Sit and Goes
February 16, 2006 at 3:49 pm | In Texas Holdem No Limit | Leave a Comment
by Tom Leonard
First published in Poker Player
Let’s continue with the subject of No-Limit Sit & Goes in this column and we’ll return to Limit Hold’em in the next installment of Improving Performance. There is a powerful strategy in these Sit & Goes when approaching the money that I see many players ignore. It is simply to target the correct opponent when on the bubble. We all know not to try and tackle the chip leader unless we really have the nuts. However, if we are one of the chip leaders and the field is down to four, (the top 3 finishers make the money on a 50/30/20 percent basis) then who should you attack?
Let’s imagine a scenario where out of the total of the starting $10,000 in chips among ten players, you have $3000. The leader has $5000 and the remaining two players have $1500 and $500 respectively. Many players attempt to knock out the low man to get down to three remaining players and qualify for the money. However, the player in fourth position with only $500 and facing escalating blinds, knows he’s in trouble and is desperately looking to double up and will not need much of a hand to go all-in. He simply can’t afford to wait too long. The player who is in third place with $1500 realizes the fourth place player’s predicament and is the player you should be attacking. He realizes that as soon as the low man with only $500 gets knocked out, he will automatically back into the money. This knowledge should be used against him as he will not want to commit any of his chips without an absolute lock. Attack, attack and attack this player as he will virtually lay down 99% of his hands just waiting to get into the money. In contrast, the low man will call most any bet as he has no choice For the most part, unless you hold a monster, he will not be that much of an underdog and may well prevail in his forced stand. By the time you find yourself down to four remaining players, the blind structure is normally high enough to make these blatant steals from the third place chip stack quite profitable. You may well amass enough chips to strike fear in the heart of the chip leader.
So, here is our goal for this outing. If you find yourself in first or second place among the last four players then attack the second lowest stack vs. the lowest. The lowest stack will very often make a stand against a raise while the second lowest will be extremely cautious as he wants the lowest stack to exit first in order to make the money. Pretty basic…right? Well yeah, except I find it hard to believe how many players I see who just go into a shell at that point hoping Mr. Chip leader takes out both the short stacks. The problem with being passive and letting the chip leader do all the eliminating is that you’ll find yourself at an enormous disadvantage chip wise when you get down to heads up play You should be amassing those easy chips so you’ll have the ammo to fight for first place. Give this tactic a try and see if it improves your performance and therefore your bottom line. See you next “TIME”.
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