The Poker Player of the Year in 2005?
March 29, 2006 at 3:12 pm | In Uncategorized | Leave a CommentFirst published in Poker Player
Several different prominent members of the media and poker community compile Player of the Year rankings, usually based on the players' tournament performances during a particular calendar year. ESPN does in association with Bluff magazine, as do Card Player and TopPair magazines, and the International Poker Federation, or IPF.
Even Phil Hellmuth computes his Poker Champion of the Year rankings that appear in ALL IN magazine, but more on that later. Poker Player is wise enough not to get involved, as doing so can be the basis for some controversy, as you will see below.
It's important first to differentiate between rankings and polls. For the most part, rankings are based on some sort of predetermined criteria usually associated with a points system that rewards players depending on how they finish in major tournaments. On the other hand, polls are generally opinion-oriented, and not necessarily based on fact. Think Gallup and Harris, for example, and you'll get my drift.
I thought it might be interesting to see how the final 2005 Player of the Year rankings compared when laid out side-by-side. Those players highlighted in red appear in the Top 20 of all five of the rankings compiled; those in yelloyellow show up in four; those in green make it into three; those in blue qualify in two, and those not highlighted only appear in one.
As you can see, only two players, Phil Ivey and Allen Cunningham, finished in the Top 20 in all five of the player rankings. Both had outstanding years, and certainly are deserving of being acknowledged for their exceptional achievements by all those evaluating their play.
Five players finished in the Top 20 in four of the five player rankings, including Chris Ferguson, Men Nguyen, Scotty Nguyen, Michael Gracz, and Michael Mizrachi. Consistently in the money in major tournaments, it comes as no surprise that these fine players would find themselves ranked by most as among the world's best in 2005.
Seven more players amassed enough points to finish in the Top 20 in three of the player rankings. They were Gavin Smith, Tony Ma, Ted Forrest, Erick Lindgren, John Gale, Antonio Esfandiari, and 2005 WSOP World Champion Joseph Hachem. While certainly no one could touch Hachem's earnings in 2005, all of these outstanding pros accrued the points necessary by three different compilers to attain this high level of recognition. Those who finished in the Top 20 in two of the player rankings include John Phan, John Juanda, Eric Seidel, Ming Ly, Vinnie Vinh, Nick Schulman, Freddy Deeb, Doug Lee, and Steve Dannenmann. The other 31 players who are listed on the above chart were recognized as being a 2005 Top 20 player by only one ranking body.
Surprisingly, only Chris Ferguson was ranked #1 more than once, and then only twice. So obviously, discrepancies exist among those involved in determining the overall Player of the Year. For kicks, I dug a little deeper to reveal some of the more interesting ones.
Let's start with John Juanda, who was rated #1 in Bluff magazine's power rankings at year-end and #17 by Phil Hellmuth. Juanda finishes number #22 according to TopPair, but you have to go all the way to #122 to find him in Card Player's rankings, and you won't find his name at all among the 100 players that the IPF ranks.
While not attempting to be critical, I found Bluff's rankings somewhat confusing, because they are based on the results of a trailing 24-month period rather than everyone else's who are based on the calendar year. As evidence of this, the results reported here are as of 1/24/2006, and are updated about every two weeks. Their previous rankings from two weeks earlier, which one would assume should have been year-end results, had Juanda #1 and Ivey #2, the same way they are listed here.
Yet on January 17th, Bluff announced that Ivey was their Player of the Year! The press release states, “The Bluff Player of the Year is awarded to the player that accumulates the most points in the Bluff/ESPN Poker Power Rankings.” So even though Juanda had 100+ more points than Ivey under their power ranking system at year's end, the honor was given to Ivey instead. One can only interpret this to mean that Ivey must have accumulated more points in 2005 than Juanda did, while over the trailing 24-month period Juanda had more, but the reader has no way of really knowing for sure.
Another interesting example is John Phan, who led Card Player's leader board for much of the year, only to finish second to Men Nguyen. While his sixth place ranking by the IPF is somewhat consistent with Card Player, Phil Hellmuth has him tied for 37th, TopPair has him #38, and he comes in a rather distant 61st according to Bluff.
Raja Kattamuri, ranked #2 by the IPF, lands 133 places down TopPair's list, is 140 places down on Phil Hellmuth's, finds himself #357 in Card Player's rankings, and is not ranked at all among the 250 players that Bluff ranks.
Perhaps the most interesting of all was that of Phil Hellmuth himself. Now I really like Phil's criteria for determining rankings, as it is simple and straightforward. According to his website, only WSOP and WPT events are considered, with different multipliers used to establish points depending on the significance of the event and the amount of the buy-in, the minimum being $5,000.

But then I noticed that Phil ranked himself #7 in his own poll, while not appearing in the Top 20 of any of the others, so I thought it might be interesting to explore this in more detail.
Here's how the poker icon ranks according to the others:
TopPair: #52
IPF: unranked out of 100
Bluff/ESPN: unranked
out of 250
Card Player: #683 Hmmm. What gives? So I delved a little deeper. It appears that Phil gave himself 400 points for winning the 2005 National Heads-Up Championship and its first prize of $500,000, although it is not a WSOP or WPT event. Now I'm not trying to minimize the significance of Hellmuth winning this prestigious title; it just seems that awarding himself points for it is not consistent with the criteria that is posted on his website.
In fairness, it looks as if Phil gave the other top ten finishers in this event points in his rankings also. But there's more.
In the 2005 Tournament of Champions, Phil finished 3rd, collecting $250,000. Now this is a WSOP event, but it is a freeroll, which seemingly violates Hellmuth's $5,000 minimum buy-in requirement.
In fact, Phil did not even qualify to play in this event; he was one of three players invited by Harrah's to participate, a move on Harrah's part that spawned quite a bit of controversy. According to his points system, it would once more appear that Phil gave himself 240 points for his 3rd place finish, which is what he accords players for that particular finish in a $10,000 buy-in event.
Again, in fairness, Hellmuth also gave the other top ten finishers points under his system for their respective finishes in the TOC.
Phil's only other qualifying finish under his own parameters in 2005 was an 8th place finish in a $5000 buy-in WSOP Pot Limit Omaha event, worth 75 points according to his ranking system. Adding the three events together, one arrives at 715 points, the amount he has posted to determine his 7th place ranking. But by adhering strictly to the qualifiers that are listed on his website, Phil seemingly finished with only 75 points rather than the 715 points he claims.
If Hellmuth is going to include the results of these events or ones similar in his Poker Champion of the Year standings, perhaps he might want to clarify this on his website to avoid conjecture in the future. The ambiguity of his rankings makes one question their validity. One could even make an argument that Mr. Hellmuth, particularly in light of where he finished in the other rankings, might be engaged in yet another form of self-promotion by deceptively manipulating his own rankings for his personal benefit. Readers can draw their own conclusions. I've already arrived at mine.
ALL IN magazine also conducted a poll by asking 15 top professional players who they believed was the Player of the Year. I want to emphasize that this was a poll, based on opinion, rather than a simple or complicated method of determining a player's ranking based on performance as the others listed above. The results are listed below:
#1 Phil Ivey
#2 Chris Ferguson
#3 John Phan
#4 Allen Cunningham
#5 Mike Matusow
#6 Ted Forrest
#7 Michael Gracz
#8 John Juanda
#9 Tuan Le
#10 Minh Ly
While Phil Ivey admitted to ALL IN that he was too lazy to participate in this poll, he nonetheless emerged as the landslide winner amongst his peers. These results, with the exception of Mike Matusow, who despite having a terrific year did not finish in the Top 20 in anyone else's rankings, are extremely consistent with most of the others and in fact lend some measure of credibility to them all.
So who really was the rightful Player of the Year in 2005? Unfortunately, until a unified ranking system is put into place that everyone agrees to abide by, the reader will have to draw his or her own conclusions.
Suited Omaha Starts
March 24, 2006 at 3:49 pm | In Omaha H/L | Leave a Comment
by Richard Burke
First published in Poker Player
Hakim was taking a break from his Omaha/8 game on a cloudy Monday afternoon in midwinter. He looked glum so I went over to lend him some cheer. After some pleasantries, he asked me about suited starts in Omaha. It seemed to him that his suited starting hands weren’t standing up. When there were three or more trumps on the table, there was often a pair on the table, making someone else a Full House; when there wasn’t a pair, then his Flush would lose to a higher one.
He said he had played [As]-[2h]-[9h]-[Tc], figuring the two hearts added value to his marginal, bare Ace-Deuce. He was pleased with the Flop, [Kh]-[3h]-[8s], which gave him a draw to the nut Low and a Flush draw. The Aa on the Turn made his Flush and counterfeited his Low. The River was the [5c]. At the showdown, Hakim’s Flush lost to a higher one. “Those darn hearts cost me $36,” he groused.
I asked Hakim about how often he would have a suited start in Omaha. About half the time, he thought. I told him he wasn’t even close, it’s about 90%.
The chance that your four cards will be rainbow is 52*39*26*13/4!/C(52,4) = .105. The probability that your hand WON’T be rainbow is (1 – .105), or .895. More than 89% of the time you’ll have a single- or double-suited hand, I told him. The chart shows the distribution.

Hakim thought that even the smallest Flush would win often enough to show a profit. When the tableau is unpaired, I told him, in ten-handed Hold’Em the smallest Flush wins 76% of the time, but not in Omaha. Because four cards are dealt in Omaha, I told him, it’s quite likely that someone else also has two trumps. Only if no one else had two trumps would the smallest Flush prevail. In a ten-handed Omaha game, there are eight other trumps that could have been dealt among your nine opponents, so your only hope is that they’re all singletons: that chance is .1221, about 1 in 8.
In spite of that bad news, Hakim became even more excited about having suited starts: with a suited Honor and fortuitous tableau, he would have much better than 12.2% chance for High; plus, he might occasionally win an “emergency High” with low-ranking trumps, I warned Hakim not to go wild. With a single-suited starting hand, it’s only one chance in 104 that he’d flop a Flush, and even then he’d have to worry about the tableau pairing on the Turn or River. He’d flop a Flush draw about 1 time in 9, I told him, and not only must another trump appear, but also the board mustn’t pair. His chances for three or more trumps on an unpaired tableau are about 4.5%. A double-suited hand would double his Flush chances, still less than 10% after all the cards were out.
I told him he should think of suited starting hands just as having some extra values. He thanked me for the information and hustled back to his Omaha/8 game with a smile on his face and a spring in his step.
“De nada.”
Poker Training Drills
March 22, 2006 at 2:39 pm | In Uncategorized | Leave a Comment
by John Carlisle
First published in Poker Player
I am finding that most poker players do very little to help improve their overall game. A huge majority believe that they’ll miraculously improve simply by logging lots of hours playing online, dabbling in home games, and taking a few trips to the casino each year. While time at the tables is indeed an important factor, it is not always an optimal or effective means to personal poker betterment. I always try to encourage poker players to seek out alternate means of poker training. I compare this mentality to that of a coach of any sports team. The coach would never be so foolish as to think that the team will improve by merely scrimmaging. Instead, the coach would have a myriad of drills to promote the fundamentals of the game. We poker players can take these lessons to heart, as well. Let’s take a look at a few possible poker drills that have been a tool for some players in the past.
ESPN’s coverage of the WSOP included a humorous glance of a relatively silly game called “Blind Man’s Bluff.” This is a simple game of Texas Hold ‘Em with a twist: you hold your hole cards on your forehead for your opposition to see & you have no idea what you have. While this might seem like a goofball game reserved for drunken frat parties, it can actually be an excellent poker training drill. Without any knowledge of your own cards, all of the other important factors in poker reach heightened levels of importance. Position, bluffing, reading your opposition, and calculation of the variations of possible hands are the keys to this interesting and exciting game. When played seriously, this game can be a great exercise in poker psychology. Each player’s eyes roam between the hands of each opponent. The length of the gaze at your forehead may be a tell. The way your opposition glances at the flop and then instantly looks at your hand may indicate that you have a flush draw. At the same time, you are concentrating at not giving off tells on the strength of the hands that you can see. Put some money on the table and try some serious Blind Man’s Bluff for a new poker drill.
I encourage players to have a good poker book and a deck of cards in their possession. That way, idol moments waiting at the doctor’s office can be morphed into productive poker time. Take some time to work the deck of cards. Deal out a few dummy hands and see what might happen with the Flop, Turn, and River. With each card and each hand, see how well you can “feel” the odds and predict the outcome.
Too many players have become mired in memorization of charts, or are used to living through the percentages that appear on the TV screens when watching tournaments. Dealing out hands helps us to get a better feel for the cards and the game. The brain processes these hands more intensely than hands read in a book, simulated online, or even played in live play. The brain soaks in the visual stimuli while it compares expectations to the reality. In live games, we never know the hole cards of the opposition and we are distracted by seeking tells, money management, blind level, etc. Dealing dummy hands is a pure learning experience that old school pros swear by.
Reading people is what we all dream of being able to accurately do at the table. Luckily, there is no shortage of subjects to aid you with this endeavor. Daniel Negreanu used to hone his people reading skills by watching people at the local mall. He’d attempt to identify the emotions and mental state of passers-by by watching their faces, mannerisms, and posture. Joe Navarro is an ex-FBI counterintelligence expert who is using his insights into human behavior to become a wellrespected poker insider. You can work to sharpen your reading skills by watching the world through a different perspective. Watch people from afar in a restaurant or at work. Without hearing their voice, see if you can use their physical cues to identify the emotions. Find a way to always work on your poker skills in new and creative ways. Playing a lot of poker is not enough. Find some poker drills to get you toward your poker targets. .
Now go make it happen.
Ten Tax Tips for Gamblers and Poker Players
March 22, 2006 at 2:21 pm | In Uncategorized | Leave a Comment
Russell Fox, E.A.
first published in Poker News
Editors Note: This article is limited to the one or more Federal tax issues addressed in the article. Additional issues may exist that could affect the Federal tax treatment of the transaction or matter that is the subject of this article and the article does not consider or provide a conclusion with respect to any additional issues. With respect to any significant Federal
tax issues outside the limited scope of this opinion, the article was not written, and cannot be used by the taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding penalties that may be imposed on the taxpayer.
Taxes for gamblers is a complex area. There is no such thing as ‘one size fits all.’ Here, though, are my top ten tax tips for gamblers.
10. The Tax Court recently made a very positive ruling for all gamblers. In Castagnetta v. Commissioner (T.C. Summary 2006-24), the Court held that non-professional gamblers can, in some instances, deduct other expenses incurred while gambling. These expenses include ATM fees, office supplies, and admission fees.
The Court also held that a professional gambler does not have to be solely engaged in gambling. That has been the position of the IRS in various appeals cases. Instead, the Tax Court said that gambling must be, “the intended livelihood source…[and pursued] for income or profit.”
Unfortunately, this is a Summary Opinion and is not precedential. However, it does indicate how the Tax Court would likely rule in similar cases.
9. The IRS doesn’t believe there’s such a thing as a professional gambler. It’s part of their mindset. Even though the US Supreme Court held that you can be a professional gambler in Commissioner v. Groetzinger (480 U.S. 23 (1987)), most of the personnel in the IRS still hold this view. It will take many years before this changes. That doesn’t mean you shouldn’t file as a professional; rather, you should be aware that filing as a professional increases your chance of audit.
8. You might pay more tax filing as a professional gambler than an amateur. Professional gamblers must pay self-employment tax (social security and Medicare) on their net profits while amateurs don’t.
7. You can’t switch back and forth between being a professional and an amateur every year. Once you become a professional, you’ve made a career decision. You can switch, but expect trouble (audits) if you switch back.
6. You can’t net gambling wins with gambling losses unless you’re a professional. This is straight from the Tax Code. The Tax Code is law (Title 26, U.S.C.), and can only be changed by Congress. If you net your gambling results and you’re caught in an audit, expect to pay penalties and interest.
Why is this important? Gambling wins go on line 21 of Form 1040 (Other Income), and change Adjusted Gross Income (AGI). AGI is used to calculate limitations on many deductions, including student loan interest, medical deductions, and itemized deductions. Even if your net gambling income is $0, you could find your tax increase because you lose some deductions.
5. Live In the Right State. Not only do Americans have to pay federal income tax, most have to pay state income tax. Of course, if you live in Nevada, Florida, Texas, Alaska, South Dakota, or Wyoming you don’t have to pay state income tax. New Hampshire and Tennessee tax only dividends and interest.
Some states have very high income tax rates, such as California and New York. If you live in one of these states, you’re more likely to face the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). Other states have income taxes that do not allow deductions for gambling losses. These states include Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Ohio. If you live in one of these states, you face a gross receipts tax on your gambling wins even if you’re an overall loser. So if you are going to gamble, choose your state wisely.
4. You must report your gambling wins by session. That’s the law. So, what is a session? You can find an article I’ve previously written on this topic here.
3. The rules that apply to gambling in brick and mortar casinos apply to gambling on the Internet. This means that when you win a bet from an offshore casino, it’s income. If you try to tell the IRS that the money’s in Gibraltar, expect a chuckle from the IRS agent you’re dealing with. The United States taxes all income earned anywhere in the world. To prevent double taxation, you can deduct foreign taxes you pay (either as an itemized deduction on Schedule A or as a tax credit on line 47 of Form 1040).
2. If you have a Neteller or similar account with $10,000 or more at any time during 2005, you must report it to the government. You do this by checking a box on Schedule B of Form 1040 (and listing the country/ies) and by filing Form TD F 90.22-1 with the Department of the Treasury (not the IRS). It’s almost certain that if you do this you will be audited. The $10,000 rule is based on all such accounts on any one date. At this time, it’s unclear whether Internet cardrooms are reportable under this rule.
1. If you’re going to file as a professional, or you have any complexities on your return, see a professional tax preparer (an Enrolled Agent (EA), Certified Public Accountant (CPA) who specializes in taxes, or a tax attorney). We’re not that expensive, and if you’re a professional, you’ll likely be able to fully deduct the expense as an accounting/professional expense. Everyone’s situation is different. What is right for one person may be wrong for another. Just because you can file as a professional gambler doesn’t mean you should. A tax professional will look at the totality of your situation and give appropriate advice.
In closing, you get what you pay for. Tax software is wonderful in putting the numbers you enter exactly where you enter them. Tax software won’t make math mistakes. Tax software is ideal for simple returns. But if you have any complications on your return, the money you save not getting competent professional help you could lose by not getting all the deductions your entitled to. And if you’re thinking about not paying your taxes, ask Richard Hatch about the wisdom of that course of action.
Russell Fox, E.A., is licensed to practice before the Internal Revenue Service. He is the co-author of Mastering No-Limit Hold’em. He maintains a tax blog at taxabletalk.com
What and Who Wins an Average Game
March 21, 2006 at 2:26 pm | In Omaha H/L | Leave a Comment
by Sam Mudaro
Today we will look at the results of 10,000,000 hands dealt at an average table. Will the numbers be an average of the result attained from the loose table and the tight table?
Before I begin I will address a concept that is pretty widespread in most high/low games. It is tied somewhat to the concept of four cards working together which I have previously addressed. Ask any Omaha High/Low player what is the most important concept of the game. Inevitably you will be told to play for scoopers. A scooper is a hand that wins both the low and high halves of the pot without having to split either the high or low. It may occur when you have the best high hand and there is no qualifying low, either because no low can be made or your opponent was counterfeited on his low. The other way to scoop is to have the best high and best low with no one else having a similar or better hand. Lets take a look at who won the money at our average table.

The results here are ranked by the percentage of pots scooped by the players. Note that the results would have been the same had I ranked them by the number of pots scooped. I chose the percentage method because not all the players chose to play the same number of hands. Thus a player who scooped 2 hands out of 10 (20%) is properly weighted against a player who scooped 10 out of a 100 (10%). Clearly the loose player who scooped more then twice as much as the top money winning tight player was the biggest loser at the table!
Is conventional wisdom wrong? Should we not play to scoop? Why does a player who scoops more then twice as many hands develop into such a titanic underdog? Many factors come into play here. Clearly it is advantageous to scoop and play four cards working together than not to. When you scoop you win more money. When you play four cards working together you have a better chance of scooping. These are general guidelines and not meant to be the sole criteria for selecting starting hands. Playing four cards working together or hands that scoop does not, in and of itself, guarantee a winning session.
Our loose player above who happened to scoop the most pots is first and foremost a loose player. He/she will therefore play more hands and hence will scoop more and win more pots. We already know that the key to success is not winning more pots but winning more money. Our more conservative tighter players will play fewer hands, not chase as much and scoop less. They will however win a larger percentage the pots they enter with the stronger hands they play.
Lets take a look at the combined results:

The hands that win at an average table do indeed fall somewhere in-between those at a tight table and a loose table. It is not the arithmetic mean of both tables though. The best winning hand at the average table is the same as the tight table, 2 Pair. If we eliminate some of the rare hands, four of a kind and above, the least winning hand for both the tight and average player is the Bust. While there is a substantial drop from tight to average there is still a huge difference when compared to the loose table.
At the average table we find pretty much what we would expect. Each hand type shows a lesser loss percentage then those at the loose table. Each hand type shows a higher loss percentage then those at the tight table.

Turning our attention to dollars won and the percentage of hands played we again see that it is unhealthy for our bankroll to play more then 22% of the hands we are dealt. Selectiveness does count. Notice that even a tight player who strays and plays more than 22% runs into trouble.
Remember it is not just about being selective but being selectively aggressive. So what have we learned? The player who scoops the most is not necessarily the player who wins the most.
Scooping is great when it happens. It should not be used as the sole criteria for selecting starting hands.
The hands that win at an average table fall somewhere in-between those of a tight table and a loose table.
Next time we will take a look at which hands win a showdown. A showdown being a game in which each player keeps his or her hand to the river and the best hand wins.
Poker Is Not Gambling Part I
March 20, 2006 at 2:25 pm | In Uncategorized | Leave a Comment
by Victor Royer
First published in Poker Player
The entire history of the United States, particularly the Western lore, were all about gambling, and in particular all about poker. Even though for many years playing poker was not considered something that nice people would want to do, the fact remains that many presidents of the United States going back to the Revolutionary war, and soon thereafter, and for all the years since, all played poker.
Poker played well is not a gamble, but a game of skill and knowledge. Although there is a significant element of luck, such is present in all aspects of human life, and not relegated only to poker.
Success in business, or the success in your job, or your career, or whatever it is that is your primary endeavor and the source of income, is always, and has always been, a combination of knowledge and skill. The more knowledge you have, the better equipped you are to be successful. The better your skills in transferring that knowledge into action, the equally better your chances of success. In all these endeavors, luck will always be present, both good and bad.
Sometimes no matter how knowledgeable or how skilled you are, bad luck will simply happen to you and you have to learn how to overcome it. Doing that is also part of your knowledge and your skills, and how well you do it also directly determines your success. On the other side of the coin, equally so good luck will also visit you many times during your life, no matter what your endeavor might be. So it is for poker, where there will be many times during your poker playing career where it will appear that you can do no wrong. Those will be the great and wonderful times, because everything that you do will always work out your advantage, all hands you play will always be winners, and all your draws will come to be and win you the pot. And so it is also in life. Poker is a microcosm of life, and it equally reflects all that is good and bad in human nature.
Not all people in the world are good and not all poker players will be nice people. Not all people in the world will be equally successful, and not all poker player will be equally as profitable as others.
How well you handle your life will be reflected in how well you handle your poker playing success. If you have learned how to discipline yourself in life, you will not have trouble disciplining yourself in the play of poker. If, on the other hand, you don’t know what personal discipline is, then you will have lots of trouble in poker no matter how much you learn. Learning the theory of poker, or the theory of games, is alone not enough. In fact, learning the theory of anything is alone not enough. In order for the theory to have any practical meaning, it has to have what is called “practical application”. This practical application is the skill by which a human person is able to transcend the theory into the actual doing of it, commonly called “putting the theory into practice”. In my books I have often called this “the workability principle”.
What this simply means is the ability to be able to take the knowledge and actually apply it to realworld situations successfully.
Many people have the ability to be able to apply knowledge into realworld situations, but very few of them have the ability to be able to do it successfully on a consistent basis. Being a consistently successful and profitable poker player is very difficult, and you should have no illusions about it. Yes, there will be times when you begin to play poker and you will get enormously lucky, something that is very often called “beginners luck”. This happens with startling regularity, and I have witnessed this amongst novice players many, many times.
But such luck is fleeting, and if you do not learn to tampered it with knowledge and skill, your overall endresult experience is bound to be unlucky.
The world of card rooms and casino poker rooms is full of graveyards of the hopeful who came equipped with a little knowledge, a little skill, a lot of hope, and a great deal of beginners luck, only to discover that such luck is fickle, and that a little knowledge and little skill is not enough, and is in fact very dangerous. Such players very often experience enormous highs as they glory in their initial success, and quite as often erroneously attribute their initial success to a misperceived sense of their own skills and abilities, as well as their own sense of greatness and invincibility.
Such are signs of early danger, and if the player does not understand them he or she is heading for an inevitable disaster. In fact, any poker player who allows himself or herself to experience such great highs opens himself or herself up to equally deep lows.
We will continue with this discussion in the next issue.
Victor H. Royer is the author of 22 books on casino gaming. His newest series of 13 books – including the new release Powerful Profits from Poker – are now available in all major book stores, or from The Gambler’s Book Shop at 1-800-522- 1777, or at Amazon.com.
Moving up/SNGs for profit/Getting played back at
March 19, 2006 at 3:06 pm | In Bet Patterns | Leave a Comment
By Scott Fischman
When playing limit (Omaha and hold’em), if I am consistently averaging a profit of 2-3 BB/hour over a pretty good length of time, is it a good indicator that it’s time to move up to the next level (bankroll allowing, of course)? Do you have any other tips about when to “move on up to the Eastside”?
Thanks for the advice,
Mike
A great question, and not just because of the reference to The Jeffersons!
“Earning average” has never been a major factor in my decision to move up in levels, mostly because comparing low-limit to middle-limit games is apples to oranges. At the $3-6 hold’em table, success often comes down to catching cards while playing tighter poker than your opponents. You are going to need additional skills to succeed at $10-20 games, where you need to be able to sniff out bluffs against smarter, trickier competition.
In other words, don’t move up just because you are beating the game — move up when your bankroll and skill set allow it, and you can find a game with players you can read.
You can pay more attention to your results as you look to move up through the middle limits into the higher limits — you want to be winning consistently, feeling confident, and building a bankroll that allows you to play in a comfort zone. There are other significant factors to consider, however. Who is in the game? Are the pots big enough, the players loose enough to make you money? It’s better to stay in a $30-$60 game that you are drilling than to move up to an $80-$160 where you are eking out a small profit. Don’t move up because your ego tells you that you should be playing a bigger game — move up when it’s a good real-money decision!
Single table sit-n-gos. I do well with them, and they seem to be great practice, but I was wondering if they are something that can be played for long-term profit?
-Matt
Absolutely! I built my initial online bankroll playing sit-n-gos. Yes, they are also good for practice, but there shouldn’t be any distinction between the two: You are always practicing, even when you are playing for profit. If you can find a sit-n-go that you like, put in the hours.
I have noticed a strategic decision that comes up frequently at sit-n-gos and other tournaments with blind structures that go up quickly: When I am able to build a big stack, I am looking for spots to pick up the blinds without a contest, sometimes — if my opponents are tight or I have otherwise managed to keep steady control of the table — regardless of what I am holding. What should I do when someone “plays back at me,” moving all in when I have raised with a weak or even a moderate-strength hand? I am often getting good pot odds, say 2-to-1 or more, to call their bet, but calling and losing will take away my ability to continue to steal blinds. What is the correct play?
-dubbeemin
You’ve hit upon the primary difference between cash game and tournament strategy: Preserving power in a tournament can often be more important than doing something just because you have the right odds to do it. If calling and losing means a loss in your ability to steal in a future situation, don’t do it. You’re not only risking a potential loss in power, but if you call with junk — for everyone to see — you’re likely going to face an even more significant loss in the respect department. It’s going to be much easier for people to play back against you when they know that you are pushing with junk!
It’s okay to fold when opponents push back at you. Eventually, someone will do it when you have the goods, and you can punish them accordingly. If too many people are pushing back at you, then you may not have the “control” over the table that you thought you did: Time to readjust your strategy!
Issues of Concern
March 19, 2006 at 2:56 pm | In Uncategorized | 17 Comments
Tournament poker percentage swapping, dealmaking, and final-table structures
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by Mike Sexton
The poker world seems to be flourishing quite well these days, and that is a good thing. But, all is not hunky-dory in the tournament world, as there are issues of concern for everyone: players, those who work in the industry, those who produce poker TV shows, networks that air the shows, potential sponsors of those shows, and so on. Here are a few issues of concern:
1. Poker’s Great White Shark — Ken Adams (CBSNews.com) wrote an intriguing story with this title a few months back, concerning the integrity of tournament poker. In it, referring to the movie Jaws, he said, “Remember when the great white shark ate its first victim, how the Mayor of Amityville [actually, Amity Island] hushed it up for fear of hurting the tourism business on which the town’s economic prosperity depended?” He suggested that the leaders of the poker world had better be concerned about the risk of scandal posed by undisclosed partnerships among competing players. Adams said, “ … a major public scandal is inevitable. With tournament prize pools growing to tens of millions of dollars it is not a question of whether, but when.” He also stated, “The future health of tournament poker will be a lot better off if the risk of collusion is addressed openly and sensibly before a scandal erupts.”
It should be obvious to all that no matter how honorable the intentions of some of those who stake players or exchange a percentage of another player who’s playing in the same tournament might be, there are those who may be less scrupulous and are deliberately trying to get an edge. Either way, the perception will always be that anyone with a financial interest in another player may or may not play the same against him as he would against anyone else.
Should it be against the rules for players to “invest” in each other by swapping percentages or stake players who are playing in the same event? If so, how would such a rule be enforced?
Casey Kastle, the guy who led the way to get smoking banned in tournaments (the single greatest thing that has ever happened to tournament poker), is now campaigning to eliminate staking and swapping pieces with other players. He thinks it’s a form of cheating, and that those players who put themselves into tournaments and have no shares of others are at a disadvantage. He thinks it’s “humanly impossible” to play the same way that you might otherwise if you have a financial interest in another. He agrees with Adams’ statement: “They need to learn the lesson that the Mayor of Amityville [Amity Island] learned the hard way. Before the conflict of interest beast rises up from the deep and takes a lethal bite out of public support for tournament poker, they [industry leaders] should take preventive action.”
2. Dealmaking in Tournaments — Basically, many players like to make deals at the end of a tournament. Others who don’t like to make deals shouldn’t be put in a position of being the “bad guy” who refuses to make a deal. And, certainly, TV people don’t want any deals made (in fact, the World Poker Tour doesn’t allow them). They believe a no-deal policy makes for better play, more excitement, and much better drama for television. It also avoids the risk of losing potential sponsors who don’t want to be involved with events dampened by dealmaking.
Players realize that television enhances the number of entrants in tournaments. However, if nothing is being added to the prize pool, many believe that it’s the players’ money and they should be able to do with it what they want. I’m from the old school and agree with that. I do believe, however, that players shouldn’t be able to deal for all the money if an event is televised. As a compromise, why not allow deals for some percentage of the remaining prize money, but not all of it?
Let’s suppose that first place in a tournament is $1 million and second place is $500,000. Many players don’t want to flip a coin for half a million bucks. If nothing was added to the prize pool, in my opinion, it would be hard to tell players that they couldn’t save at least $200,000 each of that money and play for the remaining $100,000 and the title. Players are still going to be trying their best to win, and the $200,000 save would pay their expenses on tour for a year! Of course, this issue could be resolved very simply by organizers or TV people adding some money to prize pools. Once a substantial amount of money is added to the prize pool, believe me, you won’t have any players complaining about a no-deal policy.
3. Final-Table Structures in TV Tournaments — This is a hotly discussed topic among players right now. The vast majority believe that you play for four days in a big tournament and the conclusion results in a crapshoot (because the blinds and antes are increased every 30 minutes after several hours of play in a WPT event). Players say, “Give us more time to play at the final table.” Some have suggested never increasing the blinds to more than $20,000-$40,000 (most tournaments end at the $100,000-$200,000 blinds level). This sounds like a good idea on the surface, but players need to recognize the problems that go along with this.
Most WPT final tables end in five to six hours (some have taken eight hours). The first problem with lengthening a final table is production costs. It takes a large crew to put on a WPT final table. They are there setting up hours before a final table commences, as well as breaking down the set long after it ends. Overtime costs are substantial.
Money is not the only concern. Other problems arise if you lengthen final tables. The live audience provides tremendous excitement for WPT shows. How long can you expect an audience to stay? If they did stay for 12-14 hours, how much enthusiasm would they have throughout the show? And remember, no one at the venue can see anyone’s cards (meaning, it gets boring to watch). Unless someone has a vested interest in a player, it’s very unlikely that he will stay for a long final table. This is television. What would it look like if half the seats were empty at the end of the show?
If play at the final table were lengthened, it would also create serious problems for the editors. They would have much more material to review and then try to eliminate (more time and money). It’s tough now to get everything into a two-hour program. Think how hard it would be to do if the final table took twice as long. Some suggest making two programs out of the final table. Well, the Travel Channel schedules a program every Wednesday night, and I’m sure it wants an ending to every show.
Here’s another thought: The longer a tournament lasts, the more likely it is that a top pro player will win. Some pros might think that’s great, but in truth, this would not be good for them in the long run. It’s good for poker when an amateur wins a big tournament. It enables everyone to think he can also do it, and thus results in more people entering tournaments. We need to embellish this thought: “The beauty of poker is that anyone can win.”
Players have to recognize and understand that logistical problems do exist when events are televised. A great player once said to me, “Good players don’t bitch about structures, they adapt to them.” I really like that.
The world is not perfect, and neither is tournament poker. Addressing issues such as these will make it a better place. 
Mike Sexton is the host of PartyPoker.com, a commentator on the World Poker Tour (which can be seen every Wednesday on the Travel Channel), and the author of Shuffle Up and Deal (which was on The New York Times best-seller list and can be purchased at http://www.cardplayer.com/). His e-mail address is sextonpartypoker@aol.com.
Handicapping Poker Tournaments
March 19, 2006 at 2:36 pm | In Probabilities | Leave a Comment
The variables that must be considered
by Matt Matros
First published in Card Player
Poker has become so mainstream that it’s actually possible to place wagers through online betting establishments on who will win most major poker tournaments. I wonder if the day will come when we’ll walk into Vegas sportsbooks and see “World Series of Poker Odds” staring back at us in those big red lights. Since this is supposed to be a poker math column, I thought I’d take a look at how to interpret the published odds for poker tournaments, and how to handicap tournaments ourselves.
What are the chances that a given player will win a poker tournament? Well, for an average player, his chances of winning a tournament are 1/N, where N is the number of players in the event. So, in a 10-player tournament, the average person would have a 1-in-10, or 10 percent, chance of winning. But wait, what is an average player? Let’s say in our 10-player tournament that there is one exceptionally good player who is twice as good as the average player in the tournament. That means he has a 20 percent chance of winning. Let’s say furthermore that the other nine players are all about equal. That means each of those nine players has an (80/9) percent = 8.9 percent chance of winning the tournament. So, only one player in the entire field is an above-average player! In practice, this means that only the very good player should expect to make money in this 10-player tournament. The other nine players all have a negative EV (expected value).
What if we vary it a little bit and say that in addition to the one very strong player in the tournament, there is also one truly terrible player. The truly terrible player has half the chance of winning as an average player; he’s only a 1-in-20 shot (5 percent) to win the tournament. That still means that each of the other eight players, who are all about equal, has only a 9.4 percent chance of winning. It would take two truly terrible players in the field (with 5 percent chances of winning each) to offset the effect of the very good player. With one very good player, two terrible players, and seven equally skilled players, the seven middling players would once again have a 1-in-10 chance to win the tournament, making them average players, and zero EV (assuming no rake — ha!).
The point of all of this is that, for the average player, it usually takes several terrible players to make up for just one excellent player in a given tournament. We all know that terrible players find their way into poker tournaments all the time, but are there really enough of them to overcome the excellent players?
Let’s try to make some estimates to answer this question. If there are 6,000 players in the 2006 WSOP championship event, and you could perfectly rank them in skill level from 1 to 6,000, what player would you have to get down to before your group of players had a 20 percent chance of winning the tournament? 300? 600? 1,200? If the answer is 300, that means the average player among the top 300 would win the WSOP four times as often as he would if the results were based entirely on luck; 600 means the talent isn’t quite so top-heavy, and that the top 600 players win only twice as often as they’d win by chance; 1,200 means the tournament is all luck, and the top 20 percent of the field is no different from the bottom 20 percent of the field. So, how much skill is there in the WSOP main event, and how good are the very best players? No one has a definitive answer to this question. My personal opinion is that we’d need to pick the top 500 players before we would have, collectively, a 20 percent chance to win the tournament. In other words, I think most very good players win the tournament only about two and a half times as often as the average player does. Bear that in mind when making your wagers.
Next question: Starting from the bottom of the ranking list, how many players would we need to pick before we’d have a 10 percent chance to win the tournament? This question is perhaps even trickier than the first one. There are some people who play so badly (perhaps they’re playing the WSOP for fun, having never played poker before) that they essentially have zero chance of winning the tournament. And there are some players who have a clue about hand values, but have such large flaws in their games that they are at an enormous disadvantage. And then there are those who, while clearly below average, play a style that at least gives them a chance to win if they get run over by the deck. My personal estimate is that the bottom 1,500 players would collectively have a 10 percent chance to win the event.
These estimates leave 4,000 players in the middle, and to keep things simple, let’s say they’re all relatively equal in skill level. That group of players collectively has a 70 percent chance of winning the tournament. Individually, a member of that group can expect to win the tournament once every 5,714 tries. That’s better than average! So, in my opinion, there are enough bad players in the WSOP main event to offset the effect of the very good players, making it a profitable investment for the merely good players. (I hope this is encouraging to a lot of readers.)
Now, how does this affect gambling on poker? Well, let’s say we find a sportsbook that offers lines on 500 players for this year’s WSOP (I don’t think this is such a bad assumption, by the way). According to my above estimates, the average player on that list should have a line of about 2,500-1, if (and this is an enormous if) the sportsbook has accurately listed the 500 players most likely to win the tournament. In real life, there is no way anyone could know who the best 500 players in the WSOP are. Bearing this in mind, I find it hard to imagine that there should be more than 50 players deserving of a 2,500-1 line. I don’t think more than a handful of players should be listed at 1,500-1. And there isn’t a player in the world whom I’d consider a good bet at less than 1,500-1 (well, maybe Phil Ivey).
Betting the “field,” or betting that one of the unnamed players will win the tournament, is an interesting proposition. Assuming that the 500 named players are more likely than 500 random players to win the tournament, but less likely than the top 500 players would be, I’d guess that the 500 named players would collectively have about a 15 percent chance of winning the event. That leaves the other 85 percent for the field — making the appropriate odds for betting on the field 1-5.7. I’d be surprised if any sportsbook offers better than 1-9 (meaning you’d risk $900 to win $100) on the field in the 2006 WSOP. But if you do find a field wager in the neighborhood of 1-3, in my opinion you should scoop it up, assuming the sportsbook has set lines on fewer than 10 percent of the players in the field.
In summary, when considering betting on a poker tournament — and, indeed, when considering whether to enter a poker tournament — be sure to think of (1) the percentage of truly great players in the field, (2) the percentage of clueless players in the field, (3) the number of entrants in the event, (4) the “skill factor” of the event (events with more play generally enable better players to increase their edge over the field), and most obviously (5) the relative skill of the actual players you might wager on. Notice that I spent no time giving you my opinions of the relative strengths of today’s name poker players. Don’t expect that pattern to change in these pages anytime soon.
Matt Matros is the author of The Making of a Poker Player, which is available online at http://www.cardplayer.com/.
A Badly Misplayed Hand
March 17, 2006 at 6:26 pm | In Holdem Limit | 1 Comment Mistakes and lapses in judgment are costly
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by Rolf Slotboom
rolf@rolfslotboom.com
In loose-aggressive limit hold’em games, some of the most difficult hands to play are those that I really love in either tight-aggressive or loose-passive games: pocket queens and pocket jacks. In games in which lots of people see the flop even for multiple bets, these hands are often too good to get away from but very hard to defend after the flop if you have what you want: an overpair to the board. Because of the huge pot and the small size of the bets in relation to the pot, people are usually committed to go all the way to the river even with hands as marginal as a gutshot or bottom pair/ace kicker. Now, of course, if you flop a set with your Q-Q or J-J under these circumstances, it is a highly profitable situation (with people putting in a lot of money when drawing thin or even dead), but in almost any other case, your big pair will be very hard to play.
I like queens and jacks even less if, under the game conditions described here, I am up against an early-position raiser whom I don’t know or who seems to have very tight raising standards. In a $10-$20 game recently, I was up against someone who had both of these characteristics. (I had never played with him before, and from what I had seen, he needed a great hand to raise from up front.) Possibly because of this, I misplayed my pocket queens in a way that probably would not have happened under more “normal” circumstances — say, in less crazy games than this one and/or against people I could read more easily.
The Situation
While waiting for my regular pot-limit game to start, I got into a very juicy $10-$20 game. I had two rather inexperienced players to my left who knew about my reputation as a rock, but who still played back at me with some rather marginal holdings. To their left was a man in a wheelchair who asked the dealer after every flop to call the cards “because he could not see them.” I had noticed that every time he had a good hand, he was able to see the boardcards properly. I didn’t know if he was a very experienced player who was trying to act weak and ignorant or if he genuinely had problems coping with the speed of the game. What I did know was that in more than an hour of play, he had not made one single preflop raise — but on this hand, he raised from under the gun, making it $20 to go. From his general demeanor, I put him on a premium hand. To tell you the truth, I put him on aces or kings, and maybe queens, jacks, or A-K, but almost certainly a hand that he thought was a monster.
Two relatively loose players called his raise. On the button, I looked down at exactly the hand I did not want to see in this situation: pocket queens. While under normal conditions, against people I know very well, I am usually very good at making the correct preflop and post-flop decisions, in this case I didn’t like my hand much. The reason: I didn’t know enough about this player to be absolutely certain of anything he said or did. Thus, I was uncertain as to how I should rate the strength of my own holding. Instead of reraising with my quality hand (what most people would have done in this situation) or folding (what I might have done in a tight-aggressive game against someone I could confidently put on a monster*), I decided to simply flat-call. As expected, both blinds called, meaning we had six players for the flop — and I had no clue what any of them held at this stage.
*While folding a premium hand before the flop can sometimes be correct if the pot is small and you have an extremely good read on someone, in this case I knew it would probably be a five- or six-way pot. This meant that I would almost be getting the proper odds to call the raise with any pocket pair on set value alone! So, in a multiway pot like this, folding seemed out of the question — and even more so because of my good position, having most of the action in front of me.
Post-Flop Action: A Few Bad Mistakes and Lapses in Judgment
With the action flop 10
9
3
, and knowing the tendencies of some of my opponents, I wasn’t too pleased with my two queens, despite the fact that I had flopped an overpair. This was mostly because of the likelihood of big action when I would not know exactly where I was at, and because I knew that if I was behind, I would be drawing very thin. The small blind led into the preflop raiser, the big blind called, the preflop raiser immediately raised again, and the two players in the middle called quickly. I took my time to try to analyze this situation. For all the world, it looked like the preflop raiser had an overpair to the board. Now, if he did, it almost certainly would be bigger than mine, as I thought it was much more likely that he had kings or aces than jacks (and very unlikely that he had the other two queens). What’s more, if for whatever reason my read on him before the flop had been incorrect and he had a relatively weak hand like nines or tens, he now would have outflopped me and I would be drawing to two outs or fewer. Also, the small blind had led into the preflop raiser, so it was entirely possible that he had outflopped me, as well! Another problem was the fact that there were almost no cards on the turn that I would really welcome that would give me a true lock. There was only one “good” queen in the deck (the Q
would complete a flush draw that, considering the action, was almost certainly out there), and even the “good” Q
would create two possible straights. I also knew that if I called or raised now and small cards or relative blanks continued to fall, there would be no way I could lay down my hand, having invested this much money already. Also, I knew that if I called now, the flop bettor could easily reraise, with danger of the action being capped when I still would not know where I was at.
Now, while I was contemplating all of this, the flop bettor on my left simply called the raise, and then the big blind called, as well: They had not even noticed I was still in the hand, trying to figure out what to do. But these out-of-turn actions confirmed for me that I had the flop bettor beat for sure (I figured he probably held a 10 for top pair), and probably all of the other callers, as well. Now, with all of this money in the pot and the small but distinct possibility that I actually had the best hand, I decided that folding could very well be an awful mistake. I called, with the intention of letting the turn card and the subsequent action determine my best course of action.
The turn card was the 8
, completing a possible straight and creating a second flush draw. It was checked to the preflop raiser, who bet. One player called, one player folded, and it was up to me.
I thought it was highly likely now that the man in the wheelchair had aces or kings — but I also knew that both he and the other players in the game feared me quite a bit. What’s more, the turn card did present me with a semibluffing opportunity, and even if I couldn’t get the preflop raiser to fold his overpair against my “obvious” straight, at least I could get him to slow down. This way, I could probably reach the showdown for just two big bets, which seemed like an acceptable price in a pot this big, and if I improved on the river, I would almost certainly gain one or two additional bets. Also, I thought that if I made this move to raise, I could possibly get the lady in the big blind to check-reraise us and make it three bets, whether or not she actually had made her straight. I knew it was probably a bit of a long shot, but during the times I had played with her, I had always been pretty good at manipulating her and luring her into making decisions that would favor me. And with this much action from no fewer than two opponents, the man in the wheelchair might then reason that his big pair could not be any good — so I could perhaps win this huge pot with my unimproved queens. After some deliberation, I decided to go for it and use my strong image to represent the current nuts — Q-J, a hand I might very well hold in this position, and also a hand that would be consistent with both my preflop and post-flop actions. When the small blind folded, I immediately looked for eye contact with the lady in the big blind. She immediately responded as I hoped she would, by three-betting, which did not necessarily mean she had my queens beat.
I hoped the flop bettor would realize that after all of this action, there was no way his aces or kings could be good. But, alas, after some thought, he called the two extra bets — in a manner that indicated he would reach the showdown regardless of what the other players did. I cursed at myself for playing my hand this badly, and for getting myself in this situation. Because of the pot odds I had created myself, possibly with a hand that had been second-best to begin with, I was now forced to call one more bet simply to try to catch a lucky river, knowing that a jack and possibly even a queen could still rescue me. I called, and when a blank came on the river and it was bet and called, I knew that with this much money in the pot, folding a possible winner would be an absolute disaster. So, again I called, only to see all of my reads confirmed: The lady had J-9 for a pair and an open-ender, and the man in the wheelchair won a massive pot with pocket kings.
Some Final Words
When the dealer pushed this massive pot to the opposite side of the table, I replayed the hand once more. I had put a bunch of bets into the pot while knowing from the very first moment that there was a good chance I was behind. And I had tried to make up for that later in the hand by using my tight image to make a move, when I knew the man in the wheelchair would not be a good enough player to lay down the hand that I thought he had.
All in all, I had invested two small bets before the flop, two small bets on the flop, and then three big bets on the turn and one more on the river with a hand that had been in dire straits to begin with. In fact, I had played this hand like a total amateur, like a sucker who knew better but who didn’t have the courage to act according to his convictions. The end result was that I had lost 12 small bets in just one hand, and all the money went to someone who, at the river, suddenly had no problem reading the board anymore. Despite his awful play throughout the hand, he had been rewarded by winning a massive pot, for no other reason than he had found someone who had played even more awfully than he had — someone who had very well known and felt what to do, but was too stubborn to act according to his beliefs. 
Rolf “Ace” Slotboom has been a professional money player since 1998, specializing in limit hold’em and pot-limit Omaha. He is the tournament reporter for almost all major European tournaments, and is the Dutch commentator for Eurosport’s EPT broadcasts. His first book, Hold’em on the Come: Limit Hold’em Strategy for Drawing Hands, is scheduled to be available in March. Rolf can be contacted directly through his site, http://www.rolfslotboom.com/.
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