by Mike Eikenberry

First published in Poker Player Newspaper

The great baseball Hall of Fame catcher, Yogi Berra, was known for his “Yogiisms” – humorous sayings that were often confusing, at time seemingly contradictory, but had more truth in them than it first appeared. “It ain’t over ’til it’s over” and “90% of the game is 50% mental” are just two of the better known Yogiisms. A lesser known one, “Trying to Lose Can Help You Win,” recently became very meaningful to me after playing in a $50 buy-in standard one table No-Limit Hold’Em tournament online at Party Poker. The payoffs were $250 for first and $150 for second.

After an hour of intense competition, the starting field of ten had been reduced to a strong-playing woman and me. She had me outchipped $7,120 to $2,880, but I had a much bigger problem. I thought I was playing in a different type of tournament (a special Party “Step” promotion) where the last two players remaining in the ten-player starting field would advance equally, no matter who won.

However, the final two players in the “Step” had to play until one of them had all the chips. This usually was quickly accomplished by both players going all in on each hand. My opponent and I had different goals – mine was a quick exit, since I had far fewer chips than she did, it would be quicker if I lost; hers was to win the extra $100 for first place. I had been all in only twice up to this point (both times I showed the nuts) and she was expecting a tight, tough match.

In the first eight hands, my opponent laid down her small blind twice. In the other six hands, I went all in before the flop and she eventually folded each time. What was going on? I was trying to lose and move on. Instead, I had won every hand and now had the chip lead. Amazingly, we had not seen one flop.

In the next hand I just checked so she could see a flop. I was going to bet all in on any two cards and hope that she would call. The winner would have all or most of the chips. We both called and saw a flop of 8 J A, all hearts. I went all in with my diamond 4 and spade 6. She thought for quite a while, then folded.

We went on a five-minute break. I can only guess what she was thinking. Had I gone all in crazy? Was I on a heater and getting all the good hands (in fact, I had not had a pair, two face cards at one time, or an ace at any time). Was she even playing the same player? On my side, I was tired of her stalling. However, if she wanted to play around, I would just not bet at all.

After the break, I did not bet for three hands. She folded once and checked right along with me on the other two, all the way to the end where I won both showdowns with ugly hands. My frustration level was building rapidly. Maybe if she won a hand things would change. I folded my next hand before she could act- she had won her first hand. She still folded the next hand on her small blind. That was it! I was going back to the all-in-every-hand approach. I went all in the next hand with king/jack; she made her first call with ace/ten. A king hit the flop and river and it was over – she was gone in an instant.

I went looking for my special “Step” promotion credit an hour later and, to my great surprise, had won $250 instead. I was trying to lose – how could I have overcome a 3-1 chip lead, won 13 of 14 hands, and the tournament? It was at that moment I remembered the Yogiism “trying to lose can help you win.” I had read them, studied them, and debated their meaning. Now I had lived one. My game would never be the same. Thanks, Yogi.

by John Vorhaus

First published in Poker Player Newspaper

If you have an adventurous spirit, you can look for profitable opportunities in no-limit hold’em by taking cheap flops with speculative holdings and hitting the sort of (granted, infrequent) monster flops that create big action and let you take some unsuspecting slackjaw off his stack. Make no mistake, these junk calls can be hazardous to your health, but if you’re in the right kind of game, one with lots of callers and few raisers, they can be profitably played. In such games, if a couple of people limp into the pot from early position they often start a limp stampede, a limpede if you like: a cascade of callers yielding correct odds for a wide variety of hands such as unpaired picture cards, small suited connectors and pairs of any size.

Warning: Only join the limpede if you’re confident that the blinds won’t make a play for the pot with a big sweeping raise. Most often, the blinds will just call, too, though, because the sheer number of pot participants discourages frisky raises. Nevertheless, some players love to raise into big fields of limpers, and you should know if you’ve got one of these guys in the blind before you decide to junk in.

Once you’ve junked in, you’re looking for one thing and one thing only: the perfect flop. Not an okay flop. Not a draw. You want the nuts. And not just the nuts but the nuts disguised so well that your unwary foes will hand you their stacks and never know what hit them. True, this occurrence is rare, but it does happen, and it’s the only thing you should be looking for with your junk calls.

Suppose you join a limpede with 5a-6a. If the flop were to come 4-3-2 rainbow, you’d get action from A-4, certainly A-5, overpairs, maybe even naked overcards. You’d slightly fear involvement from someone holding a set, for he’d be drawing to seven outs, plus runner-runner, but you can’t worry about that, for your goal is to bet big and get paid off by someone drawing slim or dead with a good hand because he can’t conceive that you’d be in there with 5-6. Of course he can’t conceive it. That’s why you’re there in the first place!

As you walk this perilous road, be sure you don’t confuse flopping perfect with flopping dangerously almost perfect. Suppose you junk in with 5a-6a and the flop comes 9a-8a-7s. Yes, you’ve flopped a straight, but it’s the idiot end, vulnerable to T-J holdings, and also to naked tens or jacks that can improve.

And yes, you’re drawing to a flush, but if there’s another flush draw out there, it’s almost certainly better than yours. As in the previous example, you’ll have to worry about sets drawing to full houses, but now that’s just one of the many threats you face. The only card off the deck you can really love is the 7a for a straight flush — and God forbid someone has the Ja-Ta. Having achieved the rarity of flopping a made hand, you’ll nevertheless have to fold if you face significant heat. That’s not a trick many players can master.

Let us acknowledge, then, that junking in is a dangerous game. There’s tremendous reward when it works, but if you don’t know how to run scared when you miss or only half hit, or hit in an iffy situation, you’re better off sticking to standard, tight-aggressive play. But if you have a taste for adventure, try junking in from time to time. It’s fun, plus good for your image, and every now and then you can turn junk into gold.

BY STEVE ROSENBLOOM

Chicago Tribune

First published in TwinCities.com

When playing from the blinds, many top players try to lose as little money as possible. They are forced to come into the pot without seeing their cards, and they likely will be out of position for the hand.

But that situation also presents a chance to take down an unraised pot with a semi-bluff, because opponents know that the blinds could have any two cards instead of the big hands that players who voluntarily enter the pot are given credit for. With blinds at $600-$1,200 as players battled to get into the money in a $2,000-buy-in no-limit hold ‘em tournament at Bellagio in Las Vegas in December 2005, the respected Richard Tatalovich limped from early position with A-10 and a stack of about $27,000.

Action folded to David Plastik in the small blind. With about $21,000 in chips, he completed the bet while holding 9-4 of spades.

“I had chips and there was another player in the pot, so I’m getting odds,” Plastik said. “There was value in playing suited cards and trying to get lucky. If a 9 comes, I’m not going to go crazy on it. I know I’m only going to go crazy on it if it’s a flush draw or if I can make a big hand.”

The big blind checked, and the three players took a flop of 10-7-3. Plastik checked his flush draw. The big blind also checked. With top pair/top kicker, Tatalovich bet $5,000.

Plastik saw a chance to make a move, so he semi-bluffed by raising all in for an additional $16,000. This is the advantage a player in the blind can have in a limp pot. Plastik could be making this move with a set of 3s.

“That’s why I made the move, thinking he would lay it down because I could have any hand,” said Plastik, who was an accomplished photographer of rock bands before coming to poker.

If Plastik had just doubled Tatalovich’s bet, he would have been committing more than half his stack, which is essentially the same as committing all his chips, so he moved in.

“I don’t want him to call, so I figured the only way I could put the pressure on him was to put him all in,” Plastik said. “I don’t want him to make a move back on me.

“After a while, he decided he had the best hand, and he was actually right. I was very surprised that he took a chance with that hand because he could easily not have the best hand.”

Tatalovich was getting almost 3-1 on his money — calling $16,000 into a pot of about $47,000 — and couldn’t think he was a 3-1 underdog while holding top pair/top kicker. In fact, he was a 3-2 favorite.

But the turn came the jack of spades, giving Plastik the flush and the pot.

“It’s a limp pot, that’s the thing,” Plastik said. “You’re not supposed to go broke in a limp pot. I could easily have 3-7, 10-7, so many hands. I was very surprised that he called.”

Steve Rosenbloom can be reached at srosenbloom@tribune.com.

by Scott Aigner

Last issue I revealed how our local maniac stumbled onto an extremely effective strategy in tournament play. The wording here has double meaning as Doug was usually plastered at this point in the tournament as a result of his intake of alcohol. While everyone else was tightening up their play hoping that someone else would get unlucky and bomb out, Doug was stealing pot after pot and increasing his stack size even more. It didn’t matter to Doug whether he won or lost and as a result he had no fear. This made his aggressive play even more effective than usual and doubly so in tournaments (at least on the sober and reasonably minded players).

There are several strategies that one can utilize to make it deep in a tournament ( the structure of the tournament does influence these strategies ). The two most common styles that are successful in most tournaments are loose aggressive play and tight aggressive play. There are definite advantages and disadvantages to each style of play and certainly one’s own demeanor and personality influences our own style of play.. No matter what style you do choose to play the biggest factor in a tournament that looms large on everyone’s mind is survival. This can be done by either gathering a lot of chips by being willing to gamble and risk your tournament life frequently early on or by playing a controlled game waiting to catch a big hand or some good luck at just the right time.

Tom McEvoy and Dan Harrington are two well known authors who advocate the more conservative style of play. Whereas Doyle Brunson and players like Daniel Negreanu, Phil Ivey, Gus Hansen, and Tuan Le are well known for their loose aggressive style. Even among these players there are some unique strategies, abilities, and understanding of their own game that increases the success they have with the style of play they choose . For instance Dan Harrington has the ability to pull off a successful bluff at a much higher rate of success as a result of his reputation of only playing aggressively when he has the goods. Anyone who saw him succeed with a big bluff at the final table in 2004 to win a nice pot can appreciate his ability to read players and situations extremely well and use his knowledge and abilities when the time is “right” to do so. He has excellent deductive reasoning skills and he uses this ability to key on when he should risk all of his chips on a gamble and when to lay low and wait for a better opportunity. Although he rarely makes a big bluff, he also realizes that he has to accumulate chips to stick around and still have a stack that is still effective enough to deter the other opponents from stealing him blind.

On the other side of the fence Daniel Negreanu has the ability to fold a big hand based on his read of a situation. He is usually willing to gamble it up but only when he has the right odds and usually also has enough chips where he won’t get busted even if he does lose the confrontation. He also has an excellent post flop game that allows him to accumulate a lot of chips early on in a tournament. By accumulating chips he also survives the later stages when one has little choice except to gamble it up. When the tournament does get to the later stages his strategy also changes. Rather then relying strictly on his post flop abilities which become less effective, he also has learned how to contend with a lot of players who are all in before the flop as a result of the chip compression that naturally occurs with the ever rising blinds and antes. Next time I will finish up on the effectiveness of a loose aggressive strategy and a maniac named Doug.

by STEVE ROSENBLOOM of the Chicago Tribune

First published in Pioneer Press

Dicey thing, playing middle pairs, especially from early position.

Depending on how well you know your opponents and how aggressive your table is playing, your best move generally is to see if you can flop a set and play it big enough to extract the most chips without having someone draw out on you. But if you flop something bigger, then you need to figure out how to get the maximum value out of it.

With blinds at $50-$100 in the deep-stack World Poker Tour Championship at Las Vegas’ Bellagio in April, cash-game pro and tournament regular Evelyn Ng drew pocket 7s under the gun and limped in for $100. Two other players limped. Maureen Feduniak raised it to $700 in late position to show strength and thin the field.

Carlos Mortensen called from the big blind. Ng also called. The other early limpers folded.

The flop came 7-8-8. Ng didn’t just flop a set, she flopped 7s full of 8s.

“When you flop something that big and another player has raised pre-flop to establish some image of holding a big hand, you’re in great position,” said Ng, who would attempt to turn her opponent’s show of strength into a weakness by checking.

Feduniak made it $2,000 to go. Mortensen called. Ng check-raised to $5,000.

“With a pair on the board, I didn’t think I could get too much action if I check-raised on the turn, so I check-raised on the flop,” Ng said.

“I thought if I was going to get in a raise, it would have to be on the flop, because if I raised on the turn, she might let aces go.”

But it wasn’t just the move, it was the amount of Ng’s check-raise — enough to build a pot without running off her opponent.

“I didn’t want to make it too big,” Ng said, “but I thought if she had an A-K, she might take a card off for that amount, or if she had a big pair, she might take a card off.”

Indeed, Feduniak called. Mortensen folded. The turn came the king of diamonds, potentially disastrous for Ng if Feduniak held pocket kings, giving her a bigger full house than Ng’s 7s over 8s.

Ng bet $6,000 on the turn. Feduniak called. The river came the 2 of diamonds. Ng bet $17,000, about two-thirds of the pot, an amount that represented strength but was still less than half of Feduniak’s stack.

“The pot was really big,” Ng said, “so I didn’t have to make a huge, huge bet, because she probably wouldn’t call all her chips. I left her with about $20,000. I figured it was an amount that she might call if she thought her aces were good or if she thought her king was good.”

Ng got the call she wanted, then showed her full house. Feduniak mucked her cards.

Steve Rosenbloom can be reached at srosenbloom@tribune.com.

by Dennis Waterman

First published in PokerNews

Some of the hands I played or witnessed at the 2006 WSOP at the Rio will follow. It takes some good reads and some good fortune to get through these enormous minefields once you get out of the gate—it is very easy to blow yourself up.

In one event in the second hour I had 3475 in chips and was the second biggest stack at my table, three to the right of the button with AhJd and I raised it to 175 over a big blind of 50 in a hand of no-limit hold’em. Only the little blind called and he was playing 90% of the hands to this point and was the only opponent at this table that had more chips than I did. Although he held a lot chips and played a lot of hands and I already ascertained that he was unbluffable (by firing a bullet on every street at him in the 15,000 buy-in event at the Bellagio in December when he held a weak holding and yet called me down) he was no dummy, he was just super aggressive and I thought I could surmise his likely hands. The flop came J73 rainbow and I bet 400, he check-raised it to 1000 and now I am looking at a pot of 1800 and can call only 600 if I am uncertain about where I am in this hand but this will leave me with only 2300 and the pot will have 2400 in it before his likely bet. The conclusion of this line of thinking is that I should either give up the hand to a very aggressive player or move all-in. That does not seem like a choice at all but helps one decide on the appropriate action. Further I think that if he holds a set he is likely to call and try to trap me with a large check-raise on the next street and therefore that all-in is the correct play while I still have some fold equity. All of this analysis is nice but in addition I am certain that he holds KJ, QJ, JT, or J9suited and that it is surely the correct play as if he now folds I will add an important amount to my stack. I move all-in and he calls quickly with his set and turns over 33. It comes Ace, then 8 and I get up trying to find another way to play the hand. Where did I go wrong? Bad read, that is for sure.

Bad reads are unpleasant but bad plays are harder to eat and bad situations are just “coolers”. How about this one, which happened in a six handed no-limit hold’em event with a 2500 dollar buy-in. Is there some way to win this hand? Is it better to just muck it? Both are hard to imagine, as I thought what happened gave me the best chance to win the hand. First I will tell you about the hand that happened just before this one. A kid raises to 150 up front and I muck the 97off-suit I am dealt in the little blind without a lot of thought. Barry Shulman calls from the big blind and the flop comes 865 rainbow and Barry bets out like 250 with the pre-flop raiser making it 600 and Barry calling. It comes 9 and now Barry moves all-in for 1750 and the kid goes into a huddle for several minutes and calls. Barry has A7 off-suit and the kid has QQ.

On the next hand the kid is first in and makes it 150 to go off a stack of 675, another unknown player calls off a stack of 2425, and now Jason Lester makes it 700 to go (well I have known Jason since he was a teenager that arrived in New York City from Montreal in about 1976 and he is very thoughtful and a touch conservative and I have a great deal of respect for his raises and re-raises). I am on the button behind a stack that is second only to Barry’s of 2950 and look down at 10-10 and what would have been a re-raise to 900 is now a question mark. Move all-in? Call? Muck? All of these plays have been suggested by professional poker players that I have presented this situation with so there is no consensus but it is likely that one of the plays is correct. Which one? So far a short stack in first position raised, someone called, Jason re-raised, I have to find an action that suits my holding of 10-10, and Barry has yet to act behind me with his big stack—although it seems unlikely that a fifth player could enter the fray over all this potential power. I do what one does when you are undecided and call. Barry Shulman now moves all-in from the little blind with his mega stack of over 5000. Wow! The under-the-gun player with only 675 total shows his 99 to the big blind to certify it and mucks—with only 525 more I think this is a mistake once the big stack has moved in to supply you with protection. To be even more succinct I think you have to call all-in in all circumstances because of the math—you are getting a lot of pot odds to call, a big multiple of your investment (2900 in the pot for a risk of 525). The next player mucked what he claimed was AQ and that seems quite likely to me. Jason now goes into the tank in front of me with his holding of 66. If he folds I have to call because I know Barry is capable of doing this with AK, and in fact he has AcKc. Jason will win a pot of 5950 for his investment of his last 1750 and decides the math is right even though I have yet to act behind him. With Jason calling I have to muck my hand as 10-10 does not look like a good holding in a three handed pot when I have to risk my entire stack. The flop comes 965 and the meaningless 4 and 2 complete the layout and both smaller pairs in the hand flop sets. This was the key hand for me in the tournament but even knowing the hands and then the flop I am not sure of what the right action was. I do know that there was a lack of decisive action on my part and that aggressive players and maniacs would go all-in and conservative players would often muck their hands.

Onward to a 2000 no-limit hold’em event as we went under 300 players from a start of 2100 with 198 players getting paid. The blinds are 200-400 with a 50 dollar ante and one needs 11,000 to be reasonably comfortable at this level and have a range of possible actions—but par is now over 14,000 and the next level will be 300-600 with a 75 dollar ante and will require over 16,000 in chips to be okay with your status. In reality many players have large stacks of 35 to 55,000 and many others are very short stacked and will have to risk their tournament lives within the hour so the situation is set up for action with stack-bullies at every table wanting to apply pressure. A very conservative player had been on my right and anted himself to death while whining about his cards (in the meanwhile I was looking at T3 and J4 for hours on end, could he have been getting the same cards?) He was replaced by a chip bully, or a would-be chip bully—a guy who was determined to get broke but got to the money in spite of himself. He was raising 60% of the hands and playing 90% of the hands and although he was all-in a number of times with weak hands he kept surviving. Being behind him I saw my stack go from 11,000 down to 6,000 without being able to contest a single pot. The best hand I held was an A6 behind one of his raises to 2000 in midfield. My only amusement was waiting to see what he would turn over next. Bill Gazes raised one hand from the button and he moved all-in with J9 off-suit and Bill called him with AQ off-suit and the guy stayed alive when it came K93 brick, brick. Another hand he moved all-in with a stack of 6100 from mid-field with 33 and the big blind called off a big stack with A9. Bully doubled up again and was back in action. Even though it is easy to see what and how the bully was playing it is hard to play back at him without a mid-sized hand like AT suited or 77. It is very hard to like K9 off-suit against just him and in most cases there are x other player yet to act. He will certainly be calling your all-in so you do have to beat him! During the bubble round a tight player raised off a big stack and bully re-raised from the button. After some thought Mr. Tight mucked QQ face up. A terrible play in my opinion and even the bully was stunned speechless.

Until next time play good…and get lucky!

by Tim Lavalli

First published in PokerNews

In Super System the legendary Doyle Brunson wrote:

“I appear to be a lucky player because every time a big pot comes up, I usually have the worst hand.”

I know when I first read the line I was absolutely clueless. Not that I didn’t understand what Doyle was saying, I didn’t understand poker at all. Only a year or so later when I was ready for the Great One did I reread Super System. When I encountered this statement the second time, I was dumbfounded, I didn’t get it or perhaps I just wasn’t ready, I still chased flush draws to a raise.

Fortunately I am not alone. Bill Edler told me the other day that it was this exact line from Doyle Brunson that changed his game forever. But there is still hope

for my game because also told me that when he read it the first time all he could think was:

“What?”

and on the second reading:

“What? Doyle?”

and after the third reading:

“Are you crazy?”

but on the fourth reading (Doyleisms are worth at least four readings) he got it!

About a year later, Bill told this story to Gavin Smith and heard Gavin say:

“Me too! Same line but I got it after only three reads.” [Gavin always was a quick study.]

Part two of this little poker lesson is a bit more difficult. You have to implement a game strategy quite different from tight is right. Only then will you “get” why some of the best players in the world often get their chips in when they are the underdog. I told Doyle the Bill & Gavin story and he said about that strategy:

“Well it’s true, it was true when I wrote it and it’s still true today.”

I will let Doyle give you the entire lesson but remember it may take a couple of reads to really get it. {from SuperSystem}

“I appear to be a lucky player because every time a big pot comes up, I usually have the worst hand. There are good reasons for that. I’m a very aggressive player. I reach out and pick up small pots all the time. I’m always betting at those pots, hammering at them. And I don’t want anybody to stop me from doing that. I don’t want anyone to defeat my style of play. And if I have any kind of hand, any kind of draw, I bet. If I get raised I don’t quit. I go ahead and get all my money in the pot, if it’s a reasonable amount, knowing I probably have the worst hand and am the underdog to win the pot”“Perhaps now you can see more clearly what I explained earlier. When a big pot comes up, I’ve usually got the worst hand. That weak player finally picked up the nuts… and that’s what I usually look at in a big pot. But, I’ve already paid for that big pot with all the other pots I’ve won. So I’m freerolling with all that weak players’ money (and the money of all the other weak players in the game).”

Editor – In other words, Doyle is willing to give back some the his opponents losses when he knowingly calls with the worst hand.  He does this in order to keep the pressure on his opponents and the control of the table with himself.  And on the occasional times that he wins the hand coming from behind, all the better. 

by Tom Leonard

First published in Poker Player

Most everyone can remember a schoolyard bully from their past. Why was this individual a bully? Because he was big enough and strong enough and possessed the disposition that he could bully weaker individuals. Some things never change and having the tools to be a bully is one of them. When you find yourself with a huge chip advantage in a tournament you need to be the bully. Some players when well ahead in a tournament go into a shell to protect their stack. They believe that they can sit back and wait for premium hands because their stack is deep enough that the blinds won't cripple them. Well, chips are power and are the strength you need to become the bully. To sit back and not bully the smaller stacks is sheer folly. Nobody liked the bully in the schoolyard but in poker you're not looking for adulation, you're looking to win. So, I think we've established that you need to be the bully and not rely on others to knock out weaker opponents. You want and need those chips. Hell, you don't want your weaker opponents to get stronger and become more of a threat. When you possess that big stack, just like the popular TV show, you have the FEAR FACTOR. Stealing becomes significantly easier as your large stack has an implied threat to it that makes many opponents hesitate to tangle with you. Even if you're called you're usually not too much of an underdog and can still win the hand. If you lose some of these pots and feel the table's image of your "Fear Factor" is beginning to wane you can always slow down for a while.

Utilizing your large chip stack to be the bully is paramount to winning tournament play. To have amassed the chips in the first place and then not use them as a weapon is the epitome of wimpy, survival type tournament play. Sure you might get some of your stack eaten away but to sit back and go into a shell is not the way you will ever win a tournament. Be the bully and use those chips to attack. Attack the weaker stacks and you might just grow your own stack. Of course catching a few lucky cards can certainly help the effort but you can't sit back and just wait for premium hands. We've all heard the old adage of "I'd rather be lucky than good". Well wouldn't you rather be lucky and good?

Our goal for this session is to embrace the title of this column when playing in a tournament and when we find ourselves with a large stack to become the bully. Resist the impulse to go into a shell to protect your stack. Remember, in a tournament, if your stack is not growing—-it's shrinking. Use your robust chip position and its implied threat to bully and attack your weaker opponents unmercifully.

Keep putting the weaker stacks to tough decisions and you'll find your stack growing and growing. Bully yourself right to the final table and then to first place. Oh, and if your aggressiveness winds up knocking you out of a tournament or two please don't whine. It's so unbecoming. See you next "TIME".

by Oklahoma Johnny Hale

First published in Poker Player

Playing poker for money… can be very difficult at times-at times it just seems like you have trouble winning a hand, and you just cannot believe the way the cards fall. You start with two aces in limit hold'em-and if you raise, you win the blinds-or, if you get cute and do not raise, you may lose a stack.

You start with 2 & 7 off-suit in the big blind, and the guy with the two aces is trying to trap and does not raise and the flop comes 7,7,2, giving you the temporary nuts. A few bets will come into the pot. Then the turn card is another ace, giving the guy with the aces the temporary nuts. A few more bets will come into the pot. Then the river card is the case 7, giving the big blind the real nuts.

Yes it was good luck to get the two aces-now you try to soft play them! You get cute and try a trap strategy play and do not raise the big blind, so you could have raised and won those blinds-but you wanted more-so you let the flop come off.

7,7,2-you now have two pair AA & 77-you like it and a few bets come in. Now you get really skillful and you hit the A and you have AAA & 77! Good luck is now your friend and you love it!

A few more bets come in… Then the river is the case 7-you still have your AAA & 77, but the big blind now has 7,7,7,7,A. You are going to lose some money. So folks I said all of that to tell you one of my rules for playing aces-ALWAYS RAISE THE MAX POSSIBLE!

Do not try to trap, or the trapper can become the trapped. Try to kill them in the spring, or they will kill you in the fall. Remember that all the trappers do not wear fur hats.

Now you may say, "that is way out and I will take my chances and try to trap once in a while." Well if you do, think on this-The guy with the big blind is not going to call you anyway-unless he helps his hand on the flop. You will just bet then and pick the pot up, but if he helps his hand, he will call and/or raise you, and you will eat like an ant-but you will dump like an elephant.

Playing poker for money is not always easy, but if you are a trapper, you may win an extra bet-on the flop or the turn-but if they hit something, you will lose a big piece of your bankroll for very little return.

What are the odds of this happening to you when you try to trap? First, the reward will be small-unless the other player picks up two pair or a straight or flush draw-and you are walking uphill. The odds of your opponent catching that fourth seven? Well, here is the math.

You have seen your two aces-and you have seen the 7,7 & 2 &(A). This is 6 cards that you know about. If you assume that the other fellow has a 7, X, there are now (52 – in the stub of the deck, = 44, but only one of these is the other 7. Therefore it is 43 to 1 that he will catch the case 7. But the point is that it happens-and when it does happen, you will have a chip wreck-and if it does not happen, you will gain very little. So… raise the pot-make them pay to play.

Until next time, remember to Stay Lucky!

by Scott Aigner

First published in Poker Player

In the last two articles, I discussed some of the reasons why playing in a straight forward fashion when you have a made hand is better than slow playing in no limit hold em. This goes for vulnerable made hands as well as hands that might not seem that vulnerable. The more opponents in the hand, the more likely one of them is going to have something they are willing to call with. Even when you have a big made hand like a set, you should bet to narrow the field, gain information on the players who do call you, eliminate free draws that can beat you both on the turn as well as the small chance that a player can catch a runner runner draw. Betting out also builds the pot so that you can make bigger value bets on the later rounds.

In the first article I stated that you can make a smaller bet to give a heads up opponent some odds in an early round. In a multi handed situation there is less need to make a small bet. The looser the opponents are, the more likely they will call a pot sized bet. Finally, each subsequent player in this setting who calls not only receives better pot odds but also increases the pot odds for the rest of the opponents in the hand as well.

In Texas hold em there are very few board textures that can come out that do not also contain some type of a draw. In fact the only boards that do not have a straight draw possibility are paired boards and K-8-2, K-7-2, and Q-7-2. Given the relative passive nature of low blind low staked no limit hold em games there are going to be a number of players calling with suited connectors and small or medium pocket pairs. This means that there will often be at least a gut shot straight draw out there in most flops. When you bet out on the flop you help to minimize an opponent from catching that lucky free card. Your bet narrows the field, allows you to gain information on the remaining players in the hand, and allows you to make a big reraise if anyone plays back at you (beware of the free card raise ploy as it does exists in no limit hold em too).

The best situation is when a player flops top pair in late position and raises your lead bet. You then have a chance to eliminate some of the initial callers. Of course a check raise will also work but I much prefer to lead out and have several calls then have a player bet and then check raise and eliminate the extra bets that I could have gained by leading into the field. It just makes more sense (and cents) to win as much as you can when you have a big hand and I have found the lead bet to be much more profitable.

Most of the situations involve flopping a set although I have also led out when I flopped a full house. In this situation I had a pair of Aces and reraised a player who was playing extremely loose aggressive. He was making a lot of pre flop raises from early position. I reraised him preflop from the BB and he called. The flop came A_8_8. I made a 1/2 pot bet without a second of hesitation. My opponent thought I was trying to steal the pot (I even implied that I was tired of his overly aggressive play). Right after I said this he just couldn't resist making a huge raise that covered me.